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Abstract
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) were originally motivated by military applications, and are
becoming integral part of more and more civilian applications to improve quality of life. With
current wireless sensor network technology, people will gain advanced knowledge of physical and
social systems, and the advent of a ubiquitous sensing era is coming. In-network processing or
data aggregation is an essential function of WSNs to collect raw sensory data and get aggregated
statistics about the measured environment, and help queriers capture the major feature or changes
of the measured systems. As more and more applications of WSNs collect sensitive measurements
of people’s everyday life, privacy and security concerns draw more and more attention.
If privacy of sensory content is not preserved, it is not feasible to deploy the WSNs for informa-
tion collection. On the other hand, if integrity of the collected sensory information is not protected,
no queriers or users can trust and/or use the collected information. Hence, two important issues
should be addressed before wireless sensor network systems can realize their promise in civilian
applications: (1) protect data privacy, so the deployment of the wireless sensor network systems is
feasible; (2) enforce integrity, so users can trust the collected information (or aggregated result).
This dissertation explores privacy and integrity of data aggregation in wireless sensor networks.
First, I present two privacy-preserving data aggregation schemes for additive aggregation func-
tions, and show that the additive aggregation functions can serve to estimate the aggregation results
for more general aggregation functions. The first scheme, Cluster-based Private Data Aggregation
(CPDA), leverages clustering protocol and algebraic properties of polynomials. It has the ad-
vantage to enable peer monitoring within a cluster. The second scheme, Slice-Mix-AggRegaTe
(SMART), builds on slicing techniques and the associative property of addition. It has the advan-
ii
tage of incurring less computation overhead for privacy-preserving data aggregation.
Then, I address both privacy of individual sensory data and integrity of aggregation result
simultaneously. It is very challenging to achieve the synergy of privacy and integrity, because
privacy-preserving schemes try to hide or interfere with data, while integrity protection usually
needs to enable peer monitoring or public access of the data. Therefore, privacy and integrity
can be the conflicting requirements, one may barricade the implementation of the other. I extend
SMART and CPDA to preserve privacy and make the queriers able to verify the integrity of data
aggregation.
To show the efficacy and efficiency of the proposed schemes, I present simulation results of our
schemes and compare their performance to a typical data aggregation scheme, Tiny Aggregation
protocol (TAG), where no privacy preservation and integrity protection is provided. We explore
multiple dimensions in design space, and investigate the trade-offs in protocol design. To the best
of our knowledge, this dissertation is among the first network protocols to preserve privacy and
integrity in data aggregation for wireless sensor networks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is usually a multihop wireless network consisting of spatially
distributed autonomous sensing devices, measuring temperature, sound, vibration, pressure, mo-
tion or speed, pollutants, location information, utility consumption level, etc. Originally motivated
by military applications, wireless sensor networks have been used in battlefield surveillance and
object tracking. Early applications of networked embedded systems (or wireless sensor networks)
include surveillance [1], tracking at critical facilities [2], or monitoring ecosystems [3, 4]. Current
trend of networked embedded computing technology is to involve humans as part of the sensing,
data collecting and computing [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. In this way, public and professional users are able
to gather, analyze and share local information to form advanced knowledge about the surrounding
physical or social world. Instead of dedicated infrastructure or special designed networks, it is
more convenient and efficient to collect commonly interested information and knowledge through
wireless sensor networks. The emerging applications with wireless sensor networks involve hu-
man as a part of sensing, data collecting, and computing. These applications announce the advent
of a new era of ubiquitous computing and communication.
1.1 Applications
A wide range of applications of wireless sensor networks is anticipated in the following areas:
public/community health monitoring, vehicular and transportation control, urban infrastructure
management/planning, etc. In this dissertation, let’s consider an advanced metering system as an
example to explain our proposed protocols, and design simulation scenarios.
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Utility companies are expecting millions of the wireless meters in the coming years. Besides
automatic reading, the great potential of advanced metering systems is the ability to implement
innovative rate policies. The wireless metering systems can provide real-time utility consumption
that will help customers decide when they should increase their electricity usage to take advantage
of cheaper power prices during low-demand periods or reduce usage when demand rises. Ad-
vanced metering accommodates this by collecting power consumption information hourly or even
in smaller intervals.
Given the advanced metering system example, the major characteristics of civilian wireless
sensor networks are summarized as follows.
1. Data Aggregation: The dominant traffic is data traffic. Usually people desire to get high
level (or aggregated) statistics rather than to learn individual behavior to capture the major
feature of the surrounding systems. For example, in advanced metering systems, in order to
determine pricing policies, real-time aggregated utility consumption information indicates
whether or not it is the peak time of utility usage. For this purpose, utility consumption of
individual households is not important. This means data aggregation is an important function
in wireless sensor networks. On the other hand, information collection in such a system with
fine granularity and over a large population will introduce a huge bandwidth demand, so it
requires efficient means to get the aggregated statistics of utility consumptions. Hence, in-
network aggregation is needed.
2. Resource Constraints: Advances in miniaturization and nanotechnology enable us to re-
duce the size and cost of embedded devices for sensing, computation and wireless com-
munication in physical world. However, small-size and low-cost devices usually have lim-
ited power, computation and storage. Also, the shared medium nature and interferences of
multihop wireless communications imply limited bandwidth among low-power embedded
devices.
3. Privacy & Integrity Concerns: Privacy and integrity are major concerns in collection of
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utility consumption information. If your neighbors or people around your house know the
utility consumption information of your household, they can easily infer when you are on
vacation, when you go to work, when you are taking shower, etc. On the other hand, in-
tegrity of the aggregated statistics about the utility consumption is a prerequisite to ensure
correct pricing, appropriate load balancing, and in general avoid chaos in advanced metering
systems.
4. Large Scale: The proliferation of embedded devices and the advances of the networked
embedded systems provide means to gather data on large scales. In the advanced meter-
ing example, millions of advance meters are involved in a certain area. We anticipate that
large-scale, on-line data collection and processing paradigms will make great impact on
both physical systems and social behaviors. Hence, scalability is one of the major design
concerns.
1.2 Motivation
In publicly accessible wireless sensor networks (e.g. the above mentioned advanced metering
systems), to encourage information sharing between users who may not trust each other, privacy
and integrity are two important properties in information collection.
Because in the civilian applications of wireless sensor networks, the data we deal with and the
environments we interact with are not only about trees in the forest and animals in habitat, rather
they may be critical to our properties, health and even lives, such systems will never succeed
without adequate provision for data privacy and integrity. Accordingly, I will focus on two aspects
of such systems, privacy preservation and integrity protection. My objective is to design protocols
for (1)protecting sensory content privacy to make the deployment of WSNs more applicable to
people; (2) enforcing integrity of collected sensory information, so users can trust it. Therefore,
we focus on privacy-preserving and integrity-protecting data aggregation protocol design. We can
anticipate trustworthy wireless sensor networks in the future.
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1.3 Challenges
Providing efficient data aggregation while preserving data privacy and integrity is a challenging
problem in wireless sensor networks due to the following factors: (1) Trust management in WSN
is very challenging. Users in the wireless sensor networks can be very curious to learn others’
private information, and the communication is over public accessible wireless links, hence the
data collection is vulnerable to attacks which threatens the privacy. Without proper protection
of privacy, the communication of privacy-sensitive data over civilian wireless sensor networks is
considered impractical. (2) During in-network aggregation, adversaries can easily alter the inter-
mediate aggregation result and make the final aggregation result deviate from the true value greatly.
Without protection of data integrity, the data aggregation result is not trustworthy. (3) Data col-
lection over wireless sensor networks does not rely on dedicated infrastructure. In many cases,
the number of nodes answering a query is unknown before the data aggregation is conducted. (4)
Resource limited portable devices cannot afford heavy computation and communication load. (5)
The requirement on accuracy of information collection (i.e., aggregated result) makes the existing
randomized privacy-preserving algorithms not suitable. Besides the above mentioned factors, it is
very challenging to protect privacy and integrity of data aggregation simultaneously, because usu-
ally privacy-preserving schemes disable traffic peer monitoring mechanisms, which reduces the
availability of information in a neighborhood to verify data integrity.
1.4 Design Objective
The overarching goal of this dissertation is to design novel network protocols for privacy-preserving
and integrity-protecting data aggregation, make the proposed protocols robust against eavesdrop-
ping, and capable of detecting data pollution. Our desired data aggregation schemes will satisfy
the following criteria:
Privacy-preservation: Privacy concern is one of the major obstacles to apply the wireless
sensor networks to civilian applications, where curious individuals may attempt to determine more
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detailed information by eavesdropping on the communications of their neighbors. It is increasingly
important to develop privacy-preserving data aggregation schemes to ensure data privacy against
eavesdropping.
Data Integrity: Since data aggregation results may be used to make critical decisions, a base
station needs to attest the integrity of the aggregated result before accepting it. Therefore, it is
important that data aggregation schemes can protect the aggregation results from being polluted
by attackers.
Efficiency: Data aggregation achieves bandwidth efficiency through in-network processing.
In integrity-protecting private data aggregation schemes, additional communication overhead is
unavoidable to achieve the additional features. However, we must keep the additional overhead as
small as possible.
Accuracy: An accurate aggregation result of sensor data is usually desired. Therefore, we
take accuracy as a criterion to evaluate the performance of integrity protecting private data aggre-
gation schemes. When accurate aggregation results are needed, schemes based on randomization
techniques [11, 12, 13] are not applicable.
In the dissertation, we adopt the above discussed metrics to explore the space and tradeoff
among the performance of the proposed algorithms. These metrics include communication and
computation overhead, efficacy of privacy and integrity protection, and accuracy of aggregated
result (as shown in Figure 1.1).
1.5 Contributions and Dissertation Outline
In this dissertation, we focus on network protocol design for privacy-preserving and integrity pro-
tecting data aggregation. We extensively study the trade-offs between efficiency and functionality
of protocols. We also investigate factors which affect the performance of the protocols, and discuss
the trade-offs between privacy preservation and integrity protection.
To the best of our knowledge, the proposed privacy-preserving data aggregation (PDA) schemes
5
 Lack of privacy and integrity protection 
Inaccuracy 
Design goal 
Protocol overhead 
Figure 1.1: Metrics and design goal
are among the first network protocols in wireless sensor networks to achieve data privacy during
information collection. A few other work (e.g. [14]) follows up our design. We also extend the
proposed privacy-preserving data aggregation schemes to protect the integrity of data aggregation.
Achieving both data privacy and integrity simultaneously in data aggregation was considered very
challenging in the past.
My dissertation is arranged as follows. Chapter 2 introduces background information. Chapter
3 summarizes previous efforts in related areas. Chapter 4 presents two privacy-preserving proto-
cols, SMART and CPDA, in data aggregation over wireless sensor networks. Then, we extend the
privacy-preserving data aggregation protocols to address integrity of data aggregation exploiting
redundancy and peer monitoring, respectively. Chapter 5 shows an extended protocol based on
SMART, called iSMART, where we construct disjoint redundant aggregation trees. When we as-
sume individual attackers where they do not collude, iSMART allows base stations to check the
integrity of final aggregation results. Chapter 6 further extends the CPDA protocol to enable the
peer monitoring in privacy-preserving data aggregation, so that data pollution can be detected ac-
cordingly. Chapter 7 discusses the trade offs between privacy preservation and integrity protection
of the proposed protocols. Chapter 8 concludes the scope of our work and discusses the future
directions of our research.
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Chapter 2
Models and Assumptions
In this chapter, we review the background of wireless sensor networks (WSNs) and existing tech-
nologies in the relevant research areas.
2.1 Network Model
A wireless sensor network can be modeled as a graph G(V,E). Figure 2.1 gives a graph repre-
senting an example network topology, and an aggregation tree (dashed lines) is the spanning tree
rooted at the base station. A vertex v, (v ∈ V) in the graph represents a node. There are three types
of nodes in the network: base station (or query station), aggregator, and leaf (sensor) node. A base
station (or a query node) is a node which issues a query to initiate a data aggregation operation, and
also the node where aggregation result is destined. Generally, the base station can be any node in
the network. Different nodes may take the base station role, however we assume there is only one
base station in a single data aggregation operation. Our proposed schemes are readily and easily
extensible to multiple base station cases. An aggregator1 is the node responsible for in-network
processing, and an aggregator takes the input result(s) from its child node(s), and provides inter-
mediate aggregated result to its parent aggregator. A leaf node is the node which does not have any
child in the aggregation tree. The role of a node is dynamically decided, depending on how the
queries are distributed into the network and how the aggregation tree is built (this will be shown in
later chapters).
An edge e, (e ∈ E) represents a communication link, usually a wireless link. As long as two
1Aggregators do not only aggregate intermediate results, but also contribute their inputs in the data aggregation.
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Figure 2.1: An example of a sensor network and an aggregation tree
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Figure 2.2: Illustration of communication in wireless sensor networks
nodes are able to communicate directly, there exists an edge connecting them in the graph. In
this dissertation, we assume the communication among sensor nodes is through a single broadcast
channel. Figure 2.2(a) illustrates that when a node C is in the transmission range of A, C will hear
the data transmitted by A. If a node B is located outside of the transmission range of A, B cannot
communicate with A. In wireless communication, contention occurs if two neighboring nodes
transmit simultaneously. Information loss may also occur due to the imperfect physical channels.
Figure 2.2(b) shows that if a message is encrypted, only the node which is in the communication
range and shares the secure key with the sender can communicate with the sender2.
2In the communication, a part of messages is encrypted. We will explain this in the security model Section 2.5.
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2.2 Data Model
A major function of sensor networks is to collect data, such as temperature, moisture, location,
acceleration, velocity, angle, weight, blood pressure, utility consumption, etc. Usually these sensor
readings are expressed as digital values, which have a certain range [dmin, dmax]. For example, an
electricity meter reading of a household is usually between 0 to 100kwh per day, depending on
the size and usage pattern. Usually these sensor readings are aggregated at the base station once
an hour or once an half hour. The time interval between two data aggregation operation in such
network is much larger than the time used for each data aggregation operation.
2.3 Service Model
Wireless sensor networks in civilian applications are used for information collection on commonly
interested resources/themes to capture the major features of physical systems or social systems. In
many cases, it is meaningful to get statistical results about the behavior of a group rather than to
learn individual behavior. This means that data aggregation is an important service (or function) in
the wireless networks. A generic data aggregation service provides a simple and efficient means
for data collection and aggregation. When a user wants to get a certain aggregated information, the
user can pull the information from all reachable nodes by posing a query from a node (base station)
in the network. The query is propagated in the network, and accordingly an aggregation tree rooted
at the base station can be built. Then, the nodes in the network route data back towards the user
through the aggregation tree. A node which forwards the query will take the aggregator role, so
the node is responsible for combining answers from their children and forwarding intermediate
aggregation results to their parents. As an example, consider a query that asks what is the size of
the network. The query on the COUNT function is posed and propagated through the network. An
aggregation tree is formed while the query is propagated. Then, each leaf node in the tree reports
value 1 to its parent; aggregators sum the received values from their children, adding 1 to it, and
report that value to their parents. As the aggregated values propagate up along the aggregation tree,
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the user can learn how many nodes are participating in the aggregation or have a certain attribute.
To carry out our protocols, the network should have a reasonable density. If the wireless sen-
sors/devices from a specific service provider cannot form a network with sufficient density, the
service provider may use third party network facility/infrastructure to complete the data aggrega-
tion task.
2.3.1 Efficiency of Data Aggregation
Devices in wireless sensor networks (or sensors) are often resources-limited or energy-constrained.
Hence, it is important to design and develop efficient data processing techniques to make effective
use of the data. Data aggregation [15] is an efficient mechanism in query processing in which data
is processed and aggregated within the network. Only processed and aggregated data is returned
to the base (or query) station. In such a setting, aggregators collect the raw information from the
individual nodes, process it locally, and reply to the aggregate queries of a remote user. Compared
to the centralized approach where all raw data are returned, data aggregation can achieve a signifi-
cant reduction in communication overhead and hence save resource consumption and increase the
life time of wireless sensor networks. As an example, Figure 2.3 shows a network with 7 nodes.
When data is collected without data aggregation, totally 17 transmissions are needed; however,
with data aggregation only 7 transmissions are needed. As the network size grows (for example, if
the network size is 2500), data collection without data aggregation will consume extremely large
bandwidth as shown in [15].
In order to save resources and energy in aggregated information collection, data should be
aggregated to avoid overwhelming amounts of traffic in the network. There has been extensive
work on data aggregation schemes in sensor networks, including [15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20]. These
efforts share the assumption that all sensors are trusted and all communications are secure.
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2.3.2 Aggregation Functions
Consider N sensor nodes in the network. A generic aggregation function is defined as y(t) ,
f(r1(t), r2(t), · · · , rN(t)), where ri(t) denotes the individual data sensed/owned by node i at time
t, where f is a recursive function. Typical functions of f include sum, average, min, max and
count. In this dissertation, we focus on additive aggregation functions. It is worth noting that
using additive aggregation functions is not an exclusively restrictive assumption, because it serves
as the base of many other statistics functions, such as mean, count, variance, standard deviation,
etc. For example, to get the variance of all the sensed data ri(t), i ∈ V, f(t) =
∑
i(r
2
i (t))/N −
((
∑
i ri(t))/N)
2, each node only needs to contribute three inputs as the original data in the additive
data aggregation, they are 1 (count), ri(t), and r2i (t).
Furthermore, functions such as min and max, can also be approximated through additive func-
tions. This is because max(x1, ..., xN) = limk→∞(xk1 + ... + x
k
N)
1/k and min(x1, ..., xN) =
limk→−∞(xk1 + ... + x
k
N)
1/k. Hence, we can assign k to a large value estimate max(x1, ..., xN)
and min(x1, ..., xN) accordingly. Therefore, in the dissertation we only study data aggregation
for additive function, i.e, y(t) ,
∑N
i ri(t). Such approximation sacrifices accuracy to implement
more aggregation functions based on additive aggregation functions3.
2.4 Attack Model
There exist multiple potential attacks against a data aggregation protocol. Some attacks aim to
disrupt the normal operation of the sensor network, such as routing attacks and DoS attacks. A
good number of previous efforts [21, 22, 23] have addressed these behavior-based attacks. In this
dissertation, we do not worry about those attacks. Rather, our major concern is the types of attacks
which try to break the privacy and/or integrity of aggregation results. We assume a small portion of
sensor nodes can be compromised, and focus on the defence of the following categories of attacks
3The more accuracy we can get from additive aggregation functions, the more accuracy we can have for the
approximation. In this dissertation, our schemes are targeted for additive aggregation functions.
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in wireless sensor networks.
Eavesdropping: In an eavesdropping attack, an attacker attempts to obtain private informa-
tion by overhearing the transmissions over its neighboring wireless links or colluding with other
nodes to uncover the secret of a certain node. Eavesdropping threatens the privacy of data held by
individual nodes.
Data Pollution: In a data pollution attack, an attacker tampers with the intermediate aggrega-
tion result at an aggregation node. The purpose of the attack is to make the base station receive
the wrong aggregation result with large deviation from the original result, and thus lead to im-
proper or wrong decisions. In this dissertation, we do not consider the attack where a node reports
a false reading value, because as indicated in [24] [25], the impact of such an attack is usually
limited. With privacy preservation measures, the individual sensory data is hidden. However, the
aggregated value of a small group of sensors must be in a reasonable range, as long as the sensory
data is in a certain range. This implies that a malicious user who pollutes the individual sensory
data (at a lower level in the aggregation tree) trying to introduce a large deviation can be easily
detected4. Therefore, a more serious concern is the case where an aggregator close to the root of
the aggregation tree is malicious or compromised.
2.5 Security Model
Encryption helps to achieve confidentiality and integrity of communication. However, encryption
doesn’t automatically keep privacy of individual sensory data and integrity of aggregated data.
Since aggregation operation usually requires an aggregator to be aware of the content from its
children, the end-to-end encryption between individual nodes and the base station will paralyze
the data aggregation. On the other hand, link-level encryption itself does not keep the privacy
of individual data, since the other end of the communication link is able to decrypt message and
access the private data.
4A tradeoff is made between privacy and integrity, and it is discussed in Chapter 7.
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In the dissertation, we assume the link-level encryption is available when performing privacy-
preserving and integrity-protecting data aggregation. Generally, if no trusted party is available,
two nodes can use public-key cryptography to exchange secret information, which is then used
to establish a symmetric key to achieve link-level security. In the advanced metering scenario, it
is reasonable to assume trusted base station. Utility companies or management offices in certain
communities can serve as the trusted party. In such an environment, symmetric key techniques are
good candidates to satisfy the assumption that link-level encryption is available when needed. To
set the context, we briefly review a random key distribution mechanism proposed in [26], which
is one of the popular schemes to achieve link-level security in wireless sensor networks. Here, we
briefly review a random symmetric key distribution mechanism proposed in [26].
In [26], key distribution consists of three phases: (1)key pre-distribution, (2)shared-key dis-
covery, and (3)path-key establishment. In the pre-distribution phase, a large key-pool of K keys
and their corresponding identities are generated at the trusted party. For each sensor within the
sensor network, k keys are randomly drawn from the key-pool. These k keys form a key ring for
a sensor node. During the key-discovery phase, each sensor node finds out which neighbors share
a common key with itself by exchanging discovery messages. If two neighboring nodes share a
common key then there is a secure link between two nodes. In the path-key establishment phase,
a path-key is assigned to the pairs of neighboring sensor nodes who do not share a common key
but can be connected by two or more multi-hop secure links at the end of the shared-key discovery
phase.
In the random key distribution mechanism mentioned above, the probability that any pair of
nodes possess at least one common key is:
Pshare−key = 1− ((K − k)!)
2
(K − 2k)!K! . (2.1)
Let the probability that any other node can overhear the encrypted message by a given key be
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Poverhear. It is the probability that a third node possesses the same key as this node. Therefore,
Poverhear =
k
K
. (2.2)
The key distribution algorithm discussed above is efficient in terms of using a small number
of keys to support secure communication in a large-scale sensor network, hence preventing eaves-
dropping. This is illustrated in the following numerical example.
Assume a key pool of size K = 10000, and key ring size of k = 200. The probability that any
pair of nodes can find a shared key in common is Pshare−key = 98.3% by Equation (2.1). In other
words, the probability that a pair of nodes does not share a common key is 1.7%. For these pairs
who do not share a common key, they can use the path-key establishment procedure described
above to establish a shared key. Once a pair of nodes select a shared key, the probability that any
other node owns the same key is Poverhear = kK = 0.002, which is very small.
There may be attacks to compromise cryptographic keys for link-level communication. If a
node is compromised, the key ring of the compromised node will be obtained by the malicious
node. In this case, the probability that the malicious node can break the link level privacy between
other two nodes is Poverhear. Such probability is small. Moreover, our privacy preserving schemes
make the probability, that the private data is disclosed, much smaller than the probability that link
level privacy is broken.
Let’s consider the advanced metering system scenario. Under the context of random key distri-
bution algorithms, we should prevent one meter (or node) to possess multiple key rings. Central-
ized authority, e.g., management office may take the role to manage key rings of individual nodes
or meters. Otherwise, a malicious device has a good chance to intercept the encrypted commu-
nication between two neighboring devices; even worse, a malicious node may issue Sybil attack
[27], where a malicious node can fake multiple identities to break privacy and integrity. With the
assumption that there exists a trusted party for key distribution, the trusted party verifies identity
of sensor nodes and make sure each node cannot get multiple key rings from the trusted party. If
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Figure 2.5: Node A will treat nodes D, E and F as a single node when node A sets up secure
communication link with its neighbors.
no trusted party is available for key distribution, public-key cryptography can be used to establish
a symmetric key for communication between two sensor nodes. To prevent that one node claims
multiple identities, we assume that no two or more nodes are located in the same location. In the
advanced metering scenario, one meter is installed in one household, and no two meters are in-
stalled in the same location (house). So if a node receives multiple claims from the same direction
and roughly the same distance, the node will treat these claims as if they are from a single node5
(See Figure 2.5).
From the above, it is reasonable to assume that a secure channel between two neighboring
nodes is available in the context of this dissertation. In later chapters, we will show that our
privacy-preserving and integrity protecting protocols work well when link-level privacy is broken
with a small probability (e.g., a small portion of keys are compromised, where “a small portion”
refers to “the percentage less than 10%”).
5The standard way of estimating the direction of a sender is shown in [28] using multiple directional antenna.
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Chapter 3
Related Work
Data aggregation has the benefit to achieve bandwidth and energy efficiency in resource-limited
wireless sensor networks [15]. Previous work [16, 17, 18, 19, 29, 30, 20, 31] addresses data
aggregation in various application scenarios with the assumption that all sensors are working in
trusted and friendly environments. However, in reality, sensor networks are likely to be deployed
in an untrusted environment, where links can be eavesdropped and messages can be altered. An
adversary may manipulate the sensory data in wireless sensor networks. LeMay et al. summarize
the functional characteristic of wireless metering sensors and categorizes attackers in [32], where
both privacy and security are concerns in the given scenarios.
Wireless sensor networks are operated in an open, publicly accessible, and untrusted environ-
ment. Therefore, integrity of data aggregation is a big concern. As a result, existing research
addresses the integrity of data aggregation in wireless sensor networks. Previous work [33, 24]
investigate secure data aggregation against adversaries who try to tamper the intermediate aggre-
gation result. To reinforce security in sensor networks, communications are usually encrypted and
authenticated.
Przydatek, Song and Perrig proposed SIA protocol [33]. SIA addresses data integrity by con-
structing efficient random sampling mechanisms and interactive proofs. There are three stages in
the SIA protocol: computation of the result, committing to the collected data and reporting back
the aggregation result, and proving the correctness of the result. SIA is the first work on secure in-
formation aggregation in sensor networks that can handle malicious aggregators and sensor nodes.
The drawback of this protocol is that the statistical security property is achieved under the as-
sumption of a single-aggregator model, where sensor nodes send their data to a single-aggregator
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node. In this way, the interactive verification (or authentication) procedure results in additional
bandwidth consumption. When the sample size is large, the additional communication overhead
can be large.
Yang, Wang, Zhu and Cao propose SDAP protocol [24] for secure data aggregation in sensor
networks using “divide-and-conquer” and “commit-and-attest” principles. The principle “divide-
and-conquer” means that SDAP dynamically partitions the topology tree into multiple logical
groups (subtrees) of similar sizes. Hence, fewer nodes are under a high-level aggregator node
in the logical subtree. In this case, the potential security threat by data pollution from a high-level
aggregator node is reduced. By “commit-and-attest”, SDAP enhances an hop-by-hop aggregation
protocol with commitment capability. After the base station collects aggregation results from all
the groups, it identifies the suspicious groups based on a bivariate multiple-outlier detection al-
gorithm. The suspicious groups then need to prove the correctness of their aggregation results.
The base station discards the results from suspicious groups, if they cannot show the correctness
of their previous aggregation results. Similar to SIA, the overhead for grouping, commitment and
attestation can be large.
Chan, Perrig and Song propose a guaranteed detection scheme for arbitrary manipulation dur-
ing the data aggregation process in [34]. In this scheme, the query node collects and disseminates
necessary information (labels), so that a node can verify whether or not the aggregation result has
been polluted when the node has received all the labels of its off-path nodes. This work assumes
that the query node knows the total number of reachable sensor nodes. However, in wireless net-
works, usually a query node cannot know how many nodes have a certain attribute (so these nodes
will answer the query) before the data aggregation is conducted.
In data aggregation, if we encrypt data, an aggregator has to decrypt each received message,
then aggregate the messages according to the corresponding aggregation function, and finally en-
crypt the aggregation result before forwarding it. It is fairly expensive and complicated to perform
“decryption-aggregation-encryption” procedure for data aggregation. As a result, [35] and [36]
propose homomorphic stream ciphers that allow efficient aggregation of encrypted data without
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decryption for additive aggregation functions. An simple example of homomorphic encryption is
make every sensor node shares a key (a number) with base station. When a sensor node reports
the private data, it uses the private data plus its key as the data to be aggregated. As the aggregated
data received by base station, the base station deduces the sum of original data by subtracting the
sum of the keys from sum of the aggregated data. However, when the number of nodes answering
the query is not fixed, such scheme may cause inaccuracy. Because, it is hard for base station to
know who participated the data aggregation, the base station doesn’t know which keys to use in
the subtraction.
In this dissertation, we assume the link-level encryption is available for our proposed privacy-
preserving and integrity-protecting data aggregation protocol. Previous efforts on symmetric key
techniques for wireless sensor networks justify such an assumption. The goal of using symmetric
keys in WSNs is to use small amount of storage to achieve good secure connectivity and good
resilience to node captures. There are a bunch of work investigating symmetric key management
in WSNs domain.
In a master key based protocol [37] by Lai, Kim and Verbauwhede, a single master key is
pre-distributed to all nodes in a network. A pair of nodes use the master key to establish a session
key. Each node uses one unit of memory to store the master key, and it is very memory efficient.
However, resilience of the master key scheme is poor since once the master key is disclosed, all
links are compromised.
Camtepe and Yener propose a combinatorial design of key distribution of symmetric keys [38],
where m is a design parameter. The scheme supports (m2 + m + 1) nodes in the network and
the key-pool size is (m2 + m + 1). Each node carries m + 1 keys and every pair of nodes has
exactly one key in common. Therefore, communications among network nodes are secure. When
one node is captured, with the probability of 1
m
, a link in the network will be compromised. The
limitation of this scheme is that it does not apply to arbitrary number of nodes in the network.
Eschenauer and Gligor propose a random key pre-distribution scheme [26] to address the stor-
age limitation problem of the symmetric key allocation. In the random key pre-distribution scheme,
19
each node selects a subset of random keys from a pool of keys before deployment. The probability
that any pair of nodes possesses at least one common key is p, thus with p probability two nodes
can share secret.
To increase resilience of a network against node capture, Chan, Perrig and Song extend the ran-
dom key pre-distribution scheme to use q−composite keys to establish a secure link [39], where
q (q > 1) common keys are needed instead of just one. In random key scheme, two immediate
neighbors are connected by a secure link with probability p, and there is always a chance that the
graph may not be fully connected, and the chances are increasing as q increases. While detecting
the disconnection, the network can increase transmission range by increasing transmission power,
and thus introduce more interference. Another limitation of random key schemes is communica-
tion overhead during key set up phase after deployment.
Pairwise key distribution schemes [40] [41] and [42] are based on Blom’s key pre-distribution
scheme and are able to bolster privacy and authentication.
In privacy-preserving domain, Huang et al. address the problem in a peer-to-peer network
application in [43]. They constructed a friends peer-to-peer overlay to gather PC configuration
samples using history-less random walk, during which search is carried out simultaneously with
secure parameter aggregation for troubleshooting. This work uses clustering to preserve the pri-
vacy of an individual configuration.
In wireless sensor network environments, Horey et al. propose a data collection scheme based
on negative survey [44], where sensor nodes transmit a sample of the data complementary to a base
station instead of transmitting their actual data. The base station then uses the negative samples to
reconstruct a histogram of the original sensor readings. The protocol is computationally simple,
hence it can be implemented efficiently on existing sensor network platforms. In negative survey
scheme, accuracy will be suffered when the sensing data is in a large range. In [14], Feng et al.
propose a family of secret perturbation-based schemes that can protect sensor data confidentiality
without disrupting additive data aggregation result. We proposed two privacy-preserving data
aggregation protocols in [45], which is the original idea of this dissertation. These efforts in
20
privacy preservation domain do not assume data manipulation/pollution attacks. In [46], Ganti et
al. present architectural components for privacy guarantees on stream data from private owned
sensors to collect mutually interested aggregated phenomena.
Privacy has also been studied in the data mining domain [11, 47, 12, 13]. Two major classes
of schemes are used. The first class is based on data perturbation (randomization) techniques. In
a data perturbation scheme, a random number drawn from a certain distribution is added to the
private data. Given the distribution of the random perturbation, recovering the aggregated result
is possible. At the same time, by using the randomized data to mask the private values, privacy
is achieved. However, data perturbation techniques have the drawback that they do not yield
accurate aggregation results. Furthermore, as shown by Kargupta et al. in [12] and by Huang et
al. in [13], certain types of data perturbation might not preserve privacy well. Another class of
privacy-preserving data mining schemes [48, 49, 50] is based on Secure Multi-party Computation
(SMC) techniques [51, 52, 53]. SMC deals with the problem of a joint computation of a function
with multi-party private inputs. SMC usually leverages public-key cryptography. Hence, SMC-
based privacy-preserving data mining schemes are usually computationally expensive, which is
not applicable to resource-constrained wireless sensor networks.
In wireless sensor networks and recently emerged participatory sensing applications [54, 9, 55],
both privacy of individual sensing data and integrity of the final aggregated results are important,
which is the theme of this dissertation.
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Chapter 4
Privacy-preserving Data Aggregation (PDA)
Protocols
4.1 Introduction
In civilian applications, wireless sensor networks are used to collect sensitive measurements of
people’s everyday life. Hence, preserving data privacy becomes an increasingly important concern.
In the following, we first elaborate on two specific motivating applications of using wireless sensor
networks to carry out private data aggregation.
1. Wireless sensors may be placed in houses to collect statistics about water and electricity con-
sumption within a large neighborhood. The aggregated population statistics may be useful
for individual, business, and government agencies for resource planning purposes and usage
advice. However, the readings of sensors could reveal daily activities of a household, such
as when all family members are gone or when someone is taking a shower (different water
appliances have distinct signatures of consumption that can reveal their identity). Hence, we
need a way to collect the aggregated sensor readings while at the same time preserve data
privacy [32, 56, 57].
2. Future in-home floor sensors, collecting weight information, are going to be used together
with shoe-mounted sensors, collecting exercise-related information, in an obesity study to
correlate exercise and weight loss. Aggregate statistics from those data are useful for agen-
cies such as Department of Health and Human Services, as well as insurance companies for
medical research and financial planning purposes. However, individual’s health data should
be kept private and not be known to other people.
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From these data aggregation examples, we see why preserving the privacy of individual sensor
readings while obtaining accurate aggregate statistics can be an important requirement. The pro-
tection of privacy also gives us add-on benefits including enhanced security. Consider the scenario
when an adversary compromises a portion of the sensor nodes: when there is no privacy protec-
tion, the compromised nodes can overhear the data messages and decrypt them to get sensitive
information. However, with privacy protection, even if messages are overheard and decrypted, it
is still difficult for the adversary to recover sensitive information.
Consequently, providing a reasonable guideline on building systems that perform private data
aggregation is desirable. It is well-known that data encryption is able to protect private commu-
nications between two parties (such as the data source and data sink), as long as the two parties
have agreement on encryption keys. However, data encryption itself (e.g. end-to-end encryption
and/or link level encryption) is not a good solution for private data aggregation. The reasons are
as follows:
1. If end-to-end communication is encrypted, the intermediate nodes could not easily perform
in-network aggregation to get aggregated results.
2. When data are encrypted at the link level, the neighbor at the other end of the link is able to
decrypt it and get the private data. Hence, privacy is violated.
In this chapter, we present two private data aggregation protocols focusing on additive data ag-
gregation. The first scheme is called Cluster-based Private Data Aggregation (CPDA). It consists
of three phases: cluster formation, calculation of the aggregate results within clusters, and cluster
data aggregation. The second scheme is called “Slice-Mix-AggRegaTe (SMART)”. In SMART, each
node hides its private data by slicing the data and sending encrypted data slices to different aggre-
gators. Then the aggregators collect and forward data to a query server. When the server receives
the aggregated data, it calculates the final aggregation result.
To avoid confusion, Table 4.1 lists commonly used notations and variables in this chapter.
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Table 4.1: Table of Notation in Chapter 4
N Network size
Ci The cluster where node i is the cluster leader
xi Private data held by node i
di Number of neighbors around node i (e.g., degree of i)
Enc(x, k) Message x is encrypted with key k
mc Minimum cluster size to preserve privacy
mi Size of cluster Ci
q The probability that link level security is broken
P(q) Probability that private data is disclosed when link-level security is
broken with probability q
vji Intermediate value sent from j to i in CPDA protocol
J Number of pieces we slice the original data in SMART protocol
4.2 Cluster-based Private Data Aggregation (CPDA)
In this section, we present a cluster-based private data aggregation protocol, where we take ad-
vantage of algebraic properties of polynomials. In CPDA protocol, sensor nodes are divided into
clusters. Every node in a cluster participates in calculation and generates intermediate values,
which help the cluster leader to obtain the aggregation result within the cluster. There are three
steps in the CPDA protocol. We will show these steps in the following subsections.
4.2.1 Cluster Formation & Aggregation Tree Construction
The first step in CPDA is to construct clusters for in-cluster aggregation, and meanwhile to have
cluster leaders form an aggregation tree. Therefore, the intermediate aggregation results from
clusters will be finally aggregated to the base station along the aggregation tree. We propose a
distributed protocol for this purpose.
The cluster formation and the tree building procedure is illustrated in Figure 4.1. A query
server Q triggers a query by a HELLO message (as shown in Figure 4.1(a)). Upon receiving the
HELLO message, a sensor node elects itself as a cluster leader with a probability pc, which is a
preselected parameter for all nodes. In later section, we will show that pc should be a reciprocal
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of the desired cluster size (e.g., number of nodes including cluster members and cluster leader
in a cluster) in a reasonable dense network where the average number of neighbors of a node is
larger than 10. If a node becomes a cluster leader, it will forward the HELLO message to its
neighbors (node A and X in Figure 4.1(b)); otherwise, the node waits for a certain period of time1
to get more HELLO messages from its neighbors, then it decides to join one of the clusters by
broadcasting a JOIN message (as node Y and Z in Figure 4.1(b)). As this procedure goes on (as
shown in Figure 4.1(c)), clusters are constructed. In these clusters, cluster leaders are the nodes
who forward the HELLO messages, and cluster members are those who send JOIN messages.
When a node receives multiple HELLO messages, the node selects one to join. Hence, one node
is in only one cluster and each cluster has one cluster leader. Cluster leaders can tell how many
members in the cluster by counting the number of received JOIN messages.As long as a node sends
JOIN message, the node cannot change its parent (its cluster leader). Cluster leaders, relaying to
forward the HELLO message, form an aggregation tree (as shown in Figure 4.1(d)). Two factors
make the generated aggregation tree balanced. First, each node elects itself as a cluster leader
individually with a certain probability. Second, a non-leader node randomly selects a cluster to
join from all the cluster leaders who sent HELLO messages.
After a node decided to join a cluster, the node cannot change its decision later, and cluster
leaders only forward HELLO messages once. Therefore, immediately after Hello messages are
propagated to the whole network or stop being propagated due to insufficient cluster leaders, the
tree building procedure is terminated.
1In the data aggregation protocol, a node receives a request, e.g., HELLO message, for data aggregation from its
parent. The aggregation request specifies the time interval ti to receive the aggregation result from its child nodes. A
child node relays the aggregation request and specifies another time interval, say ti+1 for its child, where ti+1 < ti.
Usually ti+1 is determined according to ti. For example, we can take ti+1 = ti − necessary processing time −
time to wait more requests. Here, time to wait more requests is the time interval in which a node waits for more
HELLO messages. The reason we introduce time to wait more requests is because we want nodes evenly distributed
into different clusters. If a node decides to join a cluster immediately after it receives the first HELLO message, all
its neighboring nodes are likely to join the same cluster with the leader who sent the first HELLO message. So
time to wait more requests may last couple of seconds.
25
BA
C
ED
Q
Y
Z
H
E
L
L
O
H
E
L
L
O
H
E
L
L
O
X
H
E
L
L
O
(a) Query Server Q triggers a query
by HELLO message. A recipient of
HELLO message elects itself as a
cluster leader with probability pc.
B
A
D
E
Q
Y
Z
J
O
I
N
H
E
L
L
O
J
O
I
N
C
H
E
L
L
O
H
E
L
L
O
H
E
L
L
O
X
H
E
L
L
O
H
E
L
L
O
(b) A and X become cluster leader,
so they broadcast the HELLO mes-
sage to their neighbors.
B
A
D
E
Q
Y
Z
H
E
L
L
O
C
J
O
I
N
J
O
I
N
J
O
I
N
X
(c) Node E receives multiple
HELLO messages, then E ran-
domly selects one to join.
B
A
D
E
Q
Y
Z
C
X
(d) Several clusters have been constructed and the
aggregation tree of cluster leaders is formed.
Figure 4.1: Formation of clusters
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4.2.2 Calculation within Clusters
The second step of CPDA is the intermediate aggregations within clusters. To simplify the discus-
sion, we use a simple scenario, where a cluster contains three members: A, B, and C. a, b and c
represent the private data held by nodes A, B and C, respectively. Let A be the cluster leader of
this cluster. Let B and C be the cluster members. Our privacy-preserving aggregation protocol is
based on the additive property of polynomials. Figure 4.2 illustrates the message exchange among
the three nodes to obtain the desired sum without releasing individual private data.
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Figure 4.2: Message exchange
First, nodes within a cluster share a common (non-private) knowledge of non-zero numbers,
refer to as seeds, x, y, and z, which are distinct from each other (as shown in Figure 4.2(1)). Note,
x, y, z ∈ R. Then the node A calculates
vAA = a+ r
A
1 x+ r
A
2 x
2,
vAB = a+ r
A
1 y + r
A
2 y
2,
vAC = a+ r
A
1 z + r
A
2 z
2,
where rA1 ∈ R and rA2 ∈ R are two random numbers generated by the node A, and known only to
the node A only. Similarly, the nodes B and C calculate vBA , v
B
B , v
B
C and v
C
A , v
C
B , v
C
C independently
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as2:
NodeB : vBA = b+ r
B
1 x+ r
B
2 x
2,
vBB = b+ r
B
1 y + r
B
2 y
2,
vBC = b+ r
B
1 z + r
B
2 z
2.
NodeC : vCA = c+ r
C
1 x+ r
C
2 x
2,
vCB = c+ r
C
1 y + r
C
2 y
2,
vCC = c+ r
C
1 z + r
C
2 z
2.
Then the node A encrypts vAB and sends to B using the shared key between A and B, say kAB.
It also encrypts vAC and sends to C using the sharing key kAC between A and C (Figure 4.2(2)).
Similarly, the nodeB encrypts and sends vBA toA and v
B
C toC; the nodeC encrypts and sends v
C
A to
A and vCB toB. When the nodeA receives v
B
A and v
C
A , it has the knowledge of v
A
A = a+r
A
1 x+r
A
2 x
2,
vBA = b+ r
B
1 x+ r
B
2 x
2 and vCA = c+ r
C
1 x+ r
C
2 x
2. Next, node A calculates assembled value FA =
vAA+v
B
A+v
C
A = (a+b+c)+r1x+r2x
2, where r1 = rA1 +r
B
1 +r
C
1 and r2 = r
A
2 +r
B
2 +r
C
2 . Similarly,
the nodes B and C calculate their assembled values FB = vAB+v
B
B +v
C
B = (a+b+c)+r1y+r2y
2
and FC = vAC + v
B
C + v
C
C = (a + b + c) + r1z + r2z
2, respectively. Then the nodes B and C
broadcast FB and FC to the cluster leader A (Figure 4.2(3)). So far, the node A knows all the
assembled values:
FA = v
A
A + v
B
A + v
C
A = (a+ b+ c) + r1x+ r2x
2,
FB = v
A
B + v
B
B + v
C
B = (a+ b+ c) + r1y + r2y
2, (4.1)
FC = v
A
C + v
B
C + v
C
C = (a+ b+ c) + r1z + r2z
2.
2Note that a, b, c ∈ R are private numbers held by node A, B and C, respectively. In some applications a, b, c ∈
R+. Also vji ∈ R represents the intermediate value calculated by node j, and the value will be shared between node j
and node i for further calculation. However, rik ∈ R is node i’s private number and known only to node i.
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Then the cluster leaderA can deduce the aggregate value (a+b+c). This is because x, y, z, FA, FB, FC
are known to A. By rewriting Equation (4.1) as
U = G−1F, (4.2)
where G =

1 x x2
1 y y2
1 z z2
, U =

a+ b+ c
r1
r2
, and F = [FA, FB, FC ]T .
(a + b + c) is known as the first element of U . Note that G is of full rank3, because x, y and
z are distinct numbers. Note that in Equation 4.2, the number of unknown variables equal to the
number of columns and rows of G, which is cluster size. It implies that a larger cluster size yields
a larger dimension of G, thus the computational complexity will be larger.
It is necessary to encrypt vAB, v
A
C , v
B
A , v
B
C , v
C
A , and v
C
B . For example, if the node C overhears
the value vAB, then C knows v
A
B, v
A
C , and FA. Then C can deduce v
A
A = FA − vAB − vAC , and further
it can obtain a if x, vAA, v
A
B, v
A
C are known. However, if the node A encrypts v
A
B and sends it to
the node B, then the node C cannot get vAB. With only v
A
C , FA and x from the node A, the node C
cannot deduce the value of a. However, if the nodes B and C collude by releasing A’s information
(vAB and v
A
C ) to each other, then A’s data will be disclosed. To prevent such a collusion, the cluster
size should be large. In a cluster of size mi, if less than (mi − 1) nodes collude, the data won’t be
disclosed.
4.2.3 Cluster Data Aggregation
After the first step shown in Section 4.2.1, clusters has been formed and the aggregation tree has
been built. After the second step shown in Section 4.2.2, cluster leaders have obtained aggre-
gated value within their clusters. In the third step, cluster leaders route the derived aggregated
values back towards the query server through the aggregation tree rooted at the server according
3The rank of a matrix is the maximal number of linearly independent rows or columns. The solution of U in
Equation 4.2 is unique if and only if the rank of G equals the number of variables (or we say G is of full rank).
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to standard data aggregation protocol, e.g., TAG (Tiny AGgregation [15]).
4.2.4 Discussion on Parameter Selection in CPDA
In CPDA, a larger cluster size introduces a larger computational overhead as illustrated in Section
4.2.2. However, a larger cluster is preferred to improve privacy of the sensory data under node
collusion attacks. In CPDA, if cluster size is 1, the cluster leader is the only one in the cluster.
In this case, cluster leader’s privacy cannot be preserved in data aggregation. If cluster size is 2,
the cluster contains a cluster leader and a cluster member. cluster leader can easily deduce the
private data held by the cluster member. Therefore, let’s define mc as the minimum cluster size,
which is determined by the requirement on privacy preservation. We should guarantee a cluster
size mi ≥ mc ≥ 3, where mi is the size of the cluster with cluster leader i. The relation between
privacy preservation performance and mi will be discussed in Section 4.4.1. Next, we will discuss
how to ensure every cluster has a cluster size larger than mc, and how to tune parameter pc to
reduce communication overhead in cluster formation phase.
By counting the received JOIN messages during cluster formation phase, a cluster leader knows
the cluster size (i.e., how many cluster members) of its cluster. If a cluster Ci has a size smaller
than mc, (|Ci| < mc), the cluster leader of Ci needs to broadcast a “merge” request to join with
another cluster. In the following, we show that given a proper pc, the percentage of clusters that
need to merge is small.
We model a sensor network as a random network, assuming di is the average degree4 of a node
i. If the node i is the cluster leader of a cluster Ci, then the probability that a neighbor of i joins Ci
is
pi = P (a neighbor of i joins Ci) = (1− pc) 1
dipc
, (4.3)
where 1 − pc is the probability that the neighbor is not a leader of another cluster. Only in this
case is the neighbor able to join Ci. A neighbor is surrounded by dipc cluster leaders including
4Degree represents the number of neighbors for a node i, and it is also a measurement of the network density.
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i, therefore 1
dipc
is the probability that a non-leader neighbor of i joins Ci. The probability that
cluster Ci has k members including the leader i is:
P (|Ci| = k) =
 di
k − 1
 pi(k−1)(1− pi)di−k+1. (4.4)
Therefore, the percentage of clusters that need to merge is given by:
P (|Ci| < mc) =
mc−1∑
k=1
P (|Ci| = k)
=
mc−2∑
k=0
 di
k
 pik(1− pi)di−k. (4.5)
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of cluster size with different pc
For the convenience of analysis, let’s consider a regular network with the degree 20 (di = 20),
P (|Ci| < 3) = 6.9% if pc = 1/5; P (|Ci| < 3) = 1.8% if pc = 1/6. Figure 4.3 shows that the
distribution of the cluster size can be controlled by the parameter pc without merging. By local
observation of any sensor node, the expected number of clusters around the node i is (di + 1)pc.
On the other hand, if we desire k nodes in each cluster, then the desired number of clusters should
be di+1
k
around the node i. We have (di+1)pc = di+1k . Therefore, we target the cluster size around
k, and choose pc = 1k . In a reasonable dense network, pc value does not depend on the network
size N and the average degree.
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Note that a cluster leader is responsible for coordinating the operation within a cluster and
aggregating the cluster data. In a reasonable dense network, cluster members communication does
not need to go through the cluster leader. If a cluster member cannot detect any other members
except itself in the cluster, the cluster member may not answer the query and contribute its data in
order to keep its privacy. So a malicious node cannot get cluster members’ private data by taking
the role of cluster leader.
4.2.5 Cluster-based Secure Multiparty Data Aggregation
A cluster based secure multiparty data aggregation scheme has been proposed in [43]. Assuming
a cluster Ci has mi members (i.e., the cluster size is mi), a node in the cluster sends mi − 1 data
pieces to the other mi − 1 nodes in the cluster. Then cluster nodes aggregate the received data
pieces. Figure 4.4 shows how the secure multiparty data aggregation scheme works when mi = 3.
In the figure, the node A has data a which can be written as a = a1 + a2 + a3; the node B has
data b = b1 + b2 + b3; and the node C has data c = c1 + c2 + c3. After the message exchange
shown in Figure 4.4.(1), the node A knows a1, b1, c1, the node B gets a2, b2, c2 and the node C gets
a3, b3, c3. Hence, after B and C send a2+b2+c2 and a3+b3+c3 respectively to A shown in Figure
4.4.(2), A can calculate a+ b+ c. When we compare Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.2, we can conclude
that step (1) in Figure 4.4 and step (2) in Figure 4.2 consume the same amount of bandwidth; step
(2) in Figure 4.4 and step (3) in Figure 4.2 consume the same amount of bandwidth, too. Since
step (1) in Figure 4.2 can be reduced by using predetermined x, y, and z values, we can conclude
that secure multiparty and CPDA incur similar communication overhead. However, in the cluster-
based secure multiparty scheme, computation load is composed of addition operation only, which
is simpler than the computational complexity of CPDA. Such a scheme enlightens the SMART
protocol, which will be introduced in the following section.
The cluster based secure multiparty scheme has better computation overhead when compared
with the CPDA protocol introduced in the previous section. However, the privacy may depend on
how we decompose data a. If no negative value is allowed in a1, a2 or a3, the nodes B and C may
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guess the range of a. For example, by receiving a2 ∈ R+ the node B knows that a ≥ a1. We
illustrate the trade-off between privacy preservation performance and accuracy of data aggregation
in Chapter 7.
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Figure 4.4: Secure Multiparty Calculation
4.3 Slice-Mix-AggRegaTe (SMART) Protocol
One drawback of the cluster-based protocols is that it may introduce additional overhead to form
clusters. In this section, we present a new scheme SMART. As the name suggests, “Slice-Mix-
AggRegaTe (SMART)” is a three-step scheme for privacy-preserving data aggregation.
Step 1 (“Slicing”): Each node i (i = 1, · · · , N ), randomly selects a set of nodes Si (J = |Si|)
within h hops. In a dense network, we can take h = 1. The node i then slices its private data xi
randomly into J pieces (i.e., represents it as a sum of J numbers). Each data slice can be an integer
or a real number, can be a positive number or a negative number. How to slice the data may affect
the performance of privacy preservation and the accuracy of aggregation results. For example, if
we allow negative values in the slices, each recipient cannot narrow down the range of the private
data. On the other hand, if negative values are allowed, the positive pieces must be larger to cancel
out the negative pieces in the aggregation result. However, if data slices get lost, a larger bias will
be introduced to the aggregation results, and the accuracy is affected. We will discuss the tradeoffs
in SMART protocol in Chapter 7.
Next, we illustrate a way to slice the data. Assume the node i has value xi, and J is the
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number of slices we slice xi, so that we get a set of xij, j = 1, · · · , J and xi =
∑J
j=1 xij . If
no negative values of xij are allowed, we can slice xi as follows: we generate the first slice by
xi1 = rand() × xi; then we generate the consequent slices until the (J − 1)-th slice as xij =
rand()× (xi−
∑j−1
k=1 xik). Here, rand() is a random number generating function, which generates
a random number in range [0, 1]. For the J-th slice, we will take xiJ = xi −
∑J−1
k=1 xik. If only
integer slices are allowed, we can take floor operation when we get xij . If negative numbers are
allowed, we need first to decide how many slices are negative, and generate the negative slices.
Then we sum up the negative slices. Assume that the sum of the negative slices has absolute value
X . Then we can generate the rest of positive slices as in the case where no negative values are
allowed by treating xi as xi +X .
One of the J pieces is kept at the node i itself. The remaining J − 1 pieces are encrypted and
sent to nodes in the randomly selected set Si. We denote xij as a piece of data sent from node i to
node j. For nodes to which node i does not send any slice, xij = 0. The desired aggregate result
can be expressed as
f =
N∑
i=1
xi =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
xij, (4.6)
where xij = 0,∀j 6∈ Si. It means that there are at most J − 1 pieces of xij, (i 6= j) are not zeros.
Step 2 (“Mixing”): When a node j receives an encrypted slice, it decrypts the data using its
shared key with the sender. Upon receiving the first slice, the node waits for a certain time5, which
guarantees that all slices of this round of aggregation are received. Then, it sums up all the received
slices rj =
∑N
i=1 xij , where xij = 0, j 6∈ Si (This means if j is not a recipient of slices selected
by node i, then xij = 0.) The node j treats rj as the pseudo-data, and aggregates the pseudo-data
in Step 3.
Step 3 (“Aggregation”): All nodes aggregate the data and send the result to the query server.
Similar to the aggregation step of CPDA, the aggregation is designed using tree-based routing
5A node should wait for a certain time period to make sure the node sums up all the received slices before it sends
the aggregated result to its parent. Otherwise, the accuracy will be sacrificed. So the longer time a node waits, the
more accurate result we can get. Usually, we take waiting time as couple of seconds.
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protocols. When a node gets all data slices, it forwards a message of the sum addressed to its
parent, which in turn forwards the message along the tree. Eventually, the aggregation reaches the
root (query server). Since
N∑
j=1
rj =
N∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
xij =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
xij =
N∑
i=1
xi. (4.7)
The final data at the root is the aggregation of all sensor data f by Equation (4.6) and (4.7).
Figure 4.5 illustrates the 3-step scheme of the SMART protocol for a sensor network with network
size N = 7, slicing size J = 3, and hop length h = 1. In Figure 4.5, there is no link between i and
j if xij = 0. It means node i does not select j as a recipient of one of the slices. For SMART, in
step 1, sliced data should be encrypted as in CPDA.
When comparing with previous work [43], an advantage of the SMART protocol is that a node
can select the recipients of slices. Such flexibility gives users good control on privacy, because
users (or nodes) can always select their trusted neighbors to send slices. Another advantage is
that SMART does not rely on clusters to hide its data. Since there is no need to build clusters, the
SMART protocol is very efficient.
4.4 Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the privacy-preserving data aggregation schemes presented in this dis-
sertation. We evaluate how our schemes perform in terms of privacy-preservation, efficiency, and
aggregation accuracy. We use TAG [15], a typical data aggregation scheme as the baseline. Since
the design of TAG does not take privacy into consideration, no data privacy protection is provided.
We only use it to evaluate the efficiency and aggregation accuracy compared with our proposed
schemes.
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4.4.1 Privacy-preservation Efficacy
In order to evaluate the performance of privacy-preservation, we first define the privacy metric.
In wireless sensor networks, private data of a sensor node S may be disclosed to others when
attackers can eavesdrop on communication and/or collude. That is, there are two cases that may
lead to privacy violation: (1) An unauthorized sensor node holds a communication key and is able
to decrypt messages sent from S. Under assumed key distribution mechanism, the probability
that an eavesdropper has the communication key used by S and one of its neighbors is Poverhear
(Equation (2.2)). (2) A node may collude with other nodes to steal private data held by S. We can
define Pcollude as the probability that a node colludes with another node.
For the simplicity of derivation, we assume that link level privacy can be broken with a cer-
tain probability q, so Poverhear = q and/or Pcollude = q. To evaluate the performance of privacy
preservation, we need a privacy metric as a function of q.
Definition 1: A privacy metric P(q) is defined as the probability that the private data of node S
is disclosed when the link-level privacy (or security) is broken with probability q. P(q) measures
the performance of the privacy-preservation of a private data aggregation scheme.
Privacy-preservation Analysis of CPDA
In the CPDA scheme, private data may be disclosed to neighbors only when the sensor nodes
exchange messages within the same cluster. Given a cluster of size mi, a node needs to send
mi − 1 encrypted messages to other mi − 1 members within the cluster. Only if a node knows all
mi− 1 keys of a given member, it can crack the private data of the member. Otherwise, the private
data cannot be disclosed. Consequently, P(q) for CPDA is estimated as
P(q) =
dmax∑
k=mc
P (mi = k)q
k−1, (4.8)
where dmax is the maximum cluster size, mc is the required minimum cluster size. P (m = k)
represents the probability that a cluster size is k, which is given by Figure 4.3.
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Privacy-preservation Analysis of SMART
In the SMART scheme, a sensor node S slices its private data into J pieces and then encrypts and
sends J − 1 pieces to its neighbors. It keeps one piece to itself. As a result, the out-degree of S is
J − 1 and the in-degree of S is the number of neighbors who encrypt and send data pieces to S.
Only if an eavesdropper breaks J − 1 outgoing links and all incoming links of a node S, will it be
able to crack the private data held by S. Therefore, P(q) can be approximated by
P(q) = qJ−1
dmax∑
k=0
P (in-degree = k) qk, (4.9)
where dmax is the maximum in-degree in a network. P (in-degree = k) is the probability that the
in-degree of a node is k.
Figure 4.6 compares privacy-preservation performance of CPDA and SMART via simulation,
where we consider a 1000-node random network. The average degree of a node is 16. As we
can see from Figure 4.6 that for CPDA, the smaller the value of pc (the probability of a node
independently becoming a cluster leader), the larger the average cluster size, hence the better
the privacy-preservation performance is. However, if a cluster size is larger, the computational
overhead to compute the intermediate aggregation value by Equation (4.2) will also be larger. In
SMART, the larger the value of J (the number of slices each node chooses to decompose its private
data), the better privacy can be achieved. However, a larger J will also yield larger communication
overhead. For both CPDA and SMART, there is a design tradeoff between the privacy protection
and computation/communication efficiency.
In Figure 4.6, we can see that under CPDA and SMART, the probability that a private data
is disclosed is much smaller than the probability that a link level privacy is broken. Hence, the
proposed protocols can tolerate attacks on cryptographic keys which break the link level privacy, if
a small portion of communication keys is compromised. Another type of attack is the Sybil attack
[27], where a malicious node can fake multiple identities, collecting more information known by a
single node, to guess the private data. To fight against the Sybil attack, a node should make sure the
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sliced information is transmitted to different users in SMART. One solution is that a node selects
neighbors from different directions to send sliced pieces of data, as long as the node can estimate
the direction from which other nodes are transmitting. Techniques for estimating direction without
requiring position information are available, and discussed in the IEEE antenna and propagation
community as the Angle-of-Arrival problem [28].
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Figure 4.6: P(q) under CPDA and SMART.
4.4.2 Communication Overhead
CPDA and SMART use data-hiding techniques and encrypted communication to protect data pri-
vacy. This introduces some communication overhead. In order to investigate bandwidth efficiency
of these schemes, we have implemented CPDA and SMART in ns2 on top of the data aggregation
component of TAG, where no privacy preservation is considered. In the simulation, the physical
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layer is reliable, but we have lossy communication due to MAC layer contention. We did exten-
sive simulations and collected results to compare these two schemes together with TAG (no privacy
protection). In our experiments, we consider a network with 600 sensor nodes. These nodes are
randomly deployed over a 400meters×400meters area. The transmission range of a sensor node
is 50 meters and data rate is 1 Mbps.
At the beginning of each simulation, a query is delivered from the query server to the sensor
nodes. Similar to TAG [15], the query specifies an epoch duration, which is the amount of time for
the data aggregation procedure to finish. Upon receiving such a query, a parent node on the aggre-
gation tree subdivides the epoch such that its children are required to deliver their data (protected
data in CPDA and SMART, or unprotected data in TAG) in this parent-defined time interval.
Figure 4.7(a) shows the communication overhead of TAG, CPDA with pc = 0.3, and SMART
with J = 3 under different epoch durations. Note that TAG cannot preserve the data privacy. We
use the total number of bytes of all packets communicated during the aggregation as the metric.
Each point in the figure is the average result of 50 runs of the simulation. In each run, one randomly
generated sensor network topology is used. The vertical line of each data point represents the 95%
confidence interval of the data collected.
Simulation results can be explained by analyzing the number of exchanged messages in each
scheme. In TAG, each node needs to send 2 messages for data aggregation: one Hello message to
form an aggregation tree, and one message for data aggregation. In our implementation of CPDA,
a cluster leader sends roughly 4 messages and cluster members send 3 messages for private data
aggregation. Accordingly, 4pc+3(1−pc) = 3+pc is the average number of messages sent by a node
in CPDA. Thus, the message overhead in CPDA is less than twice as that in TAG. SMART, with
J , needs to exchange J − 1 messages during the slicing step and 2 messages for data aggregation
(the same as TAG). Hence, each node needs J + 1 messages for the private data aggregation. If
J = 3, each node needs to send 4 messages in SMART. Therefore, the communication overhead
of SMART with J = 3 is double that of TAG.
Now let us further study the effect of pc on the communication overhead in CPDA. Figure 4.7(b)
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(b) Communication overhead of CPDA with respect to pc.
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(c) Communication overhead of SMART with respect to J .
Figure 4.7: Communication overhead: We should notice that privacy does not come for free. To
preserve privacy, communication overhead is almost doubled under CPDA or SMART.
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shows the result with pc = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 respectively. As we can see, the larger the pc value, the
larger the communication overhead. It is very interesting to notice that when pc = 0.1, commu-
nication overhead6 is much lower than TAG. This is because when pc is too small, many nodes
cannot get the request for data aggregation due to insufficient number of cluster leaders who for-
ward the request. Therefore, many nodes are not aware of the request and participate in the data
aggregation. This also explains why accuracy on Count function is very low when pc = 0.1 (in
Section 4.4.3).
Finally, let us study the effect of J on the communication overhead in SMART. Figure 4.7(c)
shows the result with J = 2, 3, 4, respectively. As we can see, the larger the J value, the larger the
communication overhead. This is because J represents the number of slices each node chooses
to decompose its private data into. Since, in slicing phase of SMART, each node sends J − 1
pieces of sliced data to its selected neighbors. Including one message for tree formation and one
for aggregation, the total number of messages exchanged is roughly proportional to J + 1. Hence,
the larger the value of J , the larger the communication overhead.
We want to point out that privacy does not come for free. Figure 4.7(a) shows that to preserve
the privacy of data, bandwidth spent on privacy preserving data aggregation (e.g., in CPDA or
SMART) is almost doubled, when compared with standard data aggregation protocol (e.g., TAG).
4.4.3 Accuracy
In ideal situations when there is no data loss in the network7, both CPDA and SMART should
get 100% accurate aggregation results. However, in wireless sensor networks, due to collisions
over wireless channels and processing delays, messages may get lost or delayed. Therefore, the
aggregation accuracy is affected. We define the accuracy metric as the ratio between the collected
sum by the data aggregation scheme used and the real sum of all individual sensor nodes. A higher
accuracy value means the collected sum using the specific aggregation scheme is more accurate.
6Communication overhead is measured by the number of bytes transmitted in the network.
7Data loss may be caused by collision in wireless channels, deadline missing or disconnection to the query server
through an aggregation tree.
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An accuracy value of 1.0 represents the ideal situation.
Figure 4.8(a) shows the accuracy of TAG, CPDA (with pc = 0.3) and SMART (with J=3) from
our simulation. Here we have two observations. First, the accuracy increases as the epoch duration
increases, where epoch duration is the amount of time allowed for data aggregation to conducted.
Two reasons contribute to this: 1) With a larger epoch duration, the data packets to be sent within
this duration will have less chance to collide due to the increased average packet sending intervals;
2) With a larger epoch duration, the data packets will have a better chance of being delivered within
the deadline. The second observation is that TAG has better accuracy than CPDA and SMART. That
is because without the communication overhead introduced by privacy-preservation, there will be
less data collisions.
Figure 4.8(b) shows the aggregation accuracy of CPDA with respect to the selection of pc. First,
we see when using the same pc, a larger epoch duration gives better accuracy. This is due to the
fact that a larger epoch duration lets the data packets have a better chance of being delivered before
the timeout. Second, we see that CPDA is sensitive to pc values. The larger the pc value, the higher
the aggregation accuracy. This is because: (1)The larger pc value is, the smaller portion of nodes
are disconnected to query server through aggregation tree. Those nodes uncovered by aggregation
tree cannot contribute their value in aggregation. (2)A larger pc usually yields a smaller cluster
size, which causes less collisions within the cluster under the same epoch duration. Therefore, we
recommend 0.2 ≤ pc ≤ 0.3 in CPDA protocol.
Figure 4.8(c) illustrates the aggregation accuracy of SMART with respect to the selection of J .
Accuracy of SMART is not sensitive to J . However, there is a slightly difference between different
J values: the larger the value of J , the lower the aggregation accuracy. This is because when a
private data held by a node is sliced into more pieces, more messages are needed to send all J − 1
pieces to other neighboring nodes. Hence, more collisions occur, which causes a reduction in the
aggregation accuracy. We recommend J = 3 in SMART protocol.
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Figure 4.8: Accuracy under collision and packet loss: Note that privacy preservation adds delay
and affects accuracy of the aggregation result. Accuracy in CPDA is sensitive to parameter pc, and
CPDA incurs about 20% less accuracy than TAG. SMART incurs about 10% less accuracy than
TAG.
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4.5 Concluding Remarks
Providing efficient data aggregation while preserving data privacy is a challenging problem in
wireless sensor networks. Many civilian applications require privacy, without which individual
parties are reluctant to be involved in data collection. In this dissertation, we propose two private-
preserving data aggregation schemes, CPDA, and SMART, focusing on additive data aggregation
functions. Table 4.2 summarizes these two schemes in terms of privacy-preservation efficacy,
communication overhead, aggregation accuracy, and computational overhead 8.
Table 4.2: Performance comparison of CPDA and SMART
CPDA SMART TAG
Privacy preservation efficacy Excellent Excellent (J ≥ 3) Poor
Communication overhead Fair Fair Small
Aggregation accuracy Good (but sensitive
to pc)
Good (not sensitive
to J)
Very
Good
Computational overhead Small Small Small
In this Chapter, we compared the performance of our presented schemes to a typical data
aggregation scheme – TAG. Simulation results and theoretical analysis show the efficacy of our
two schemes.
8With the improvement by secure multiparty computing, the computation overhead of CPDA is small.
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Chapter 5
Integrity-Protecting SMART Protocol
(iSMART)
5.1 Introduction
We have addressed privacy-preserving data aggregation protocols in the previous chapter. The
next step to enforce integrity of data aggregation is to fight against Data Pollution attacks in order
to get trustable aggregation results. Data Pollution attacks aim to violate integrity by making
unauthorized changes to data, and base station will accept false reports and lead to wrong decisions.
Hence, false or biased values may cause catastrophic consequences. It is very challenging to design
a data aggregation protocol which can both protect privacy and data integrity. So we should also
investigate the possibility to address both privacy and integrity simultaneously. In this chapter, we
extend the SMART protocol and make the base station able to check the integrity of the aggregation
results under the SMART protocol. The integrity-protecting protocol based on SMART is called
iSMART.
There are two categories of data pollution attacks: (1) An attacker may serve as an aggregator.
When the attacker node forwards the aggregated results, it may modify or pollute the values. (2)
An attacker may forge false sensor readings and input the wrong data. In category (2), for queries
like average and variance, if an attacker launches forged data with a small deviation away from
true measurement, the influence of such an attack is negligible. If an attacker introduces false input
with a large deviation, such an attack can be easily detected from the context of the sensed data.
Note that even in the context of privacy-preserving data aggregation protocol, SMART, false data
injection attack with large deviation in category (2) can still be detected, if we put restriction on
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data slicing, such as giving upperbound and lowerbound of each data slice1. Based on the above
observation, we notice that the attacks in category (1) are more critical and effective. Therefore,
we focus on defending against the attacks in the first category, assuming that the attackers take the
role of aggregators, but do not forge false sensor reading.
In this chapter, we present the detailed architecture and protocol design of iSMART, which
is capable to detect data pollution attacks issued by individual (or non-collusive) aggregators, as
well as protect privacy of sensor readings. We assume that a sensor reading has a certain range
[dmin; dmax] as mentioned in data model section in Chapter 2. We also assume that the time interval
between two data aggregation operation in such network is much larger than the time used for
each data aggregation operation. This is true in advanced utility meter systems, where utility
consumption information is collected every (half) hour and the data aggregation operation is at
most couple of minutes. To carry out our protocols, the network should be dense enough. In
order to perform the basic data aggregation function, a sensor network should have reasonable
density. To achieve more features, e.g. privacy and integrity, in data aggregation, iSMART requires
sufficient density of network nodes. If the wireless sensors from specific service provider cannot
form a network with enough density, the service provider may use third party network facility to
achieve the design goal. So in this Chapter, we assume that the network has sufficient density.
How network density affects accuracy in terms of percentage of nodes which participate in data
aggregation, and message overhead is discussed in Section 5.7.2.
To protect data integrity, we build node-disjoint aggregation trees in a wireless sensor network
first, and then aggregate data along both aggregation trees in parallel. In disjoint trees, a node
does not belong to more than one aggregation tree. Hence, a malicious node can only pollute the
aggregation result on the aggregation tree it belongs to. By comparing the results from different
aggregation trees, the base station can check the integrity of the aggregation results. If the results
1This may help adversaries to narrow down the range of private data. However, we can carefully design the
upperbound and lowerbound and allow negative values in slices to achieve good balance between privacy and integrity.
The tradeoffs of privacy and integrity will be discussed in Chapter 7.
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are close2 to each other, then the base station will accept the results; otherwise, both results will
be dropped (at least one of the results got polluted). Note that by constructing disjoint aggregation
trees, we can only establish existential proof of whether or not there is data pollution for individual
attackers, but we cannot tell which node is malicious. Later in Chapter 6, we will enable peer
monitoring to detect which node is malicious. To preserve data privacy, we utilize data slicing
and assembling technique. A node hides its private reading by slicing it into pieces and then
sends encrypted data slices to different aggregators within its vicinity. Upon receiving slices from
different nodes, an aggregator decrypts the received slices3. Then the aggregator calculates the
intermediate aggregate value, and further aggregates them to the base station along the aggregation
trees. In iSMART, the integrity-protection mechanism and privacy-preservation mechanism work
synergistically while aggregation is being carried out within the network.
5.2 Protocol Overview
Data aggregation is initiated by a base station, which broadcasts a query to the whole network.
Upon receiving the query, nodes report their readings to their aggregators (parents along the span-
ning tree rooted at the base station), and then aggregators perform in-network processing and route
the aggregated results back to the base station. Integrity and privacy are two very important issues
in data aggregation. However, in most conventional data aggregation protocols, data integrity and
privacy are not preserved at the same time. This is because usually privacy-preserving schemes
need to prevent other users to access sensor reading information; on the other hand, protecting in-
tegrity requires to access sensor reading information to check the integrity. Hence, privacy preser-
vation and integrity protection are two contradictory requirements, to a certain extent. A good data
aggregation scheme needs to be carefully designed for those applications requiring both privacy
preservation and integrity protection.
2Assuming aggregation results from two different trees are ai and aj , respectively. Then, if
|ai−aj |
|min(ai,aj)| < 5%,
then we say ai and aj are close to each other.
3We assume two neighboring nodes share a common communication key.
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To achieve the integrity, we resort to redundancy check by constructing two disjoint aggre-
gation trees. Each sensor node needs to send its reading to both aggregation trees. The disjoint
aggregation trees perform data aggregation individually. Therefore, data pollution attacks can be
detected at the base station by comparing aggregation results along the disjoint aggregation trees.
If the results from different aggregation trees agree with each other, the base station will accept the
result. Otherwise, none of the result should be accepted, since the base station knows that there
exist data pollution attacks in one of the aggregation trees, but the base station cannot tell which
result is trustable. With iSMART, we can only provide existential proof to tell whether or not there
exist individual malicious pollution attacks. To detect who is the attacker requires much larger
overhead. For example, we can identify the malicious node by intelligently selecting a different
portion of the sensors to participate in the data aggregation at each round. Then, we need at least
O(logN) rounds.
To address privacy, we tailor the SMART scheme [45], where each participating node (either
a leaf node or an aggregator) hides its individual data by slicing the data and sending encrypted
data slices to different neighboring aggregators4, then the aggregators collect and route aggregated
results back to the base station. Due to the associative property of addition, “slicing” technique in
SMART is able to conceal the original sensor readings as well as keep the aggregation efficient and
accurate.
We present the details of the iSMART protocol in this chapter. There are three phases: disjoint
aggregation tree construction, privacy-preserving data report, integrity-protecting data aggrega-
tion as follows. Table 5.1 summarizes the parameters used in iSMART protocol.
5.3 Disjoint Aggregation Tree Construction (Phase I)
In order to utilize redundancy to check integrity of aggregation results, we construct node-disjoint
aggregation trees in the first phase of iSMART. Here, we want to build two disjoint aggregation
4Though a node only has one parent node (aggregator) in an aggregation tree, it is very likely that the node is able
to reach other aggregators within its transmission range
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Table 5.1: Table of Notation in Chapter 5
x(i) Private data held by node i
xij Sliced data sent from node i to node j
r(j) Assembled data at node j which is the sum of received slices
di Number of neighbors around node i (e.g., degree of i)
J Number of pieces we slice the original data in SMART protocol
Th Threshold of difference between aggregation results
pb Probability that a node selects blue color
pr Probability that a node selects red color
trees. We call the two aggregation trees, red aggregation tree and blue aggregation tree, respec-
tively. The disjoint aggregation tree construction phase can be easily generalized to build multiple
aggregation trees, that the number of disjoint trees is larger than two. However, to achieve good
coverage of multiple disjoint trees, the network must be very dense. In this phase, each node,
except the base station, takes one of the two colors: red or blue. The base station is the root of both
red aggregation tree and blue aggregation tree, so the base station has both red and blue colors.
The disjoint tree construction follows the procedure illustrated in Figure 5.1, where the dark
colored solid nodes represent blue nodes and light colored solid nodes represent red nodes, and
those without color are nodes which have not selected color yet. First, the base station BS initiates
a query by issuing a HELLO query message. Upon receiving the HELLO messages from both red
and blue nodes, a node makes it own decision on its color. As a node chooses a color (red or blue),
it joins the aggregation tree, taking the same colored parent node as its parent in the aggregation.
The the node forwards the HELLO message. If the HELLO message is forwarded by a blue node,
we say the message is in blue color. If the message is forwarded by a red node, we say the message
is in red color. A node without color means that the node is not a part of either aggregation tree
yet, this is because the node has not received both blue and red colored HELLO messages. Here, a
node selects its own color independently with equal probability to make disjoint aggregation trees
balanced. Finally, two disjoint aggregation trees are formed. These trees interweave5 with each
5When two disjoint trees are interweaved with each other, collision and interference may occur. We can rely on
link layer ACK and retransmissions to resolve the problem.
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(a) BS triggers the aggregation by a
HELLO query message, then nodes
receive such a message select their
colors: blue or red. Base station is
treated as both blue and red node.
After a node selects its color, it will
join the aggregation tree by select-
ing the same colored parent node.
Then, it will forward the HELLO
message.
(b) Node A,D,E,H, I re-
ceive HELLO messages from
both blue and red nodes, then
they randomly select their col-
ors. Now, node B,C, F,G, J
only receive HELLO from red
nodes, so they should wait un-
til they receive a HELLO mes-
sage from a blue node.
(c) As the disjoint tree
construction procedure
continues, we can form two
disjoint aggregation trees
rooted at the base station.
The blue tree and the red
tree interweave with each
other.
Figure 5.1: Illustration of disjoint tree construction.
other, so every node can access both red nodes and blue nodes in neighborhood. Since every node
has one color, one node only belongs to a single aggregation tree.
Note that if a node is unable to reach either red node or blue node within one hop, the node
cannot send its data values directly to both colored nodes. In order to achieve the separation of
data aggregation along the disjoint trees, red nodes are only allowed to aggregate values on red
tree, and vice versa. There are three situations for a node. (1) When a node has not heard any
HELLO message from neighbors, the node is not aware of the query and stays unattended. (2) If
a node hears only a red (or blue) HELLO message, then the node will wait until it hears a blue (or
red) HELLO message. Otherwise, the node stays unattended too. (3) A node receives both blue
and red HELLO messages, then the node will proceed to select its color and join either blue tree
or red tree. To make more nodes receive HELLO messages from both red and blue nodes, it is
desired to balance the red nodes and blue nodes in a certain neighborhood. This is because, for
example, if red nodes surpass blue nodes in a neighborhood, it is more likely that a given node in
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the neighborhood is surrounded by only red nodes, and cannot hear HELLO messages from blue
nodes. In this case, the given node cannot join either red tree or blue tree to participate in the data
aggregation. We will show that only a very small portion of nodes do not participate in the data
aggregation in our scheme when the network is reasonably dense (in Section 5.7).
If a node becomes a red/blue node, it will join the corresponding red/blue aggregation tree and
forward the HELLO message to its neighbors. In iSMART, the following properties are desired:
(1) The disjoint aggregation trees are interweaved with each other. Though, in this case data has
more chance to be interfered and congested with each other, we can rely on lower layer protocols to
reinforce link layer reliable transmissions. When the disjoint trees are interweaved with each other,
the network nodes can find both blue nodes and red nodes in its neighborhood. Note that if a node
does not have a red node or blue node in its neighborhood, the node cannot participate in the data
aggregation. In order to have more nodes participate in the data aggregation, thus the aggregation
result is more accurate, both aggregation trees should cover network as much as possible.
(2) On the other hand, in a very dense network, we desire that only a portion of nodes serve
as aggregators on both blue and red trees. Since the more nodes participated in forwarding the
intermediate results, the more bandwidth will be consumed. Hence, we can reduce the bandwidth
consumption by reducing the number of aggregators. However, if network density is not very large,
it is desired that all nodes receiving both red and blue HELLO messages, serve as aggregators in
order to make disjoint aggregation trees cover as much as the network.
Without loss of generality, we define pr and pb as the probability that an individual node decides
to join the aggregation tree as a red or blue aggregator, respectively. To achieve property (1), we
set pr = pb ≤ 0.5. Our protocol requires reasonable density of a network, and if the network
density is not too large, we select
pr = pb = 0.5 (5.1)
where all nodes are aggregators. Note that aggregators are sensors which are willing to forward
aggregation result, and they measure data as well as aggregate data.
52
In iSMART protocol, if the attacker is in both trees, it can pollute both trees and cheat the base
station to accept the polluted result. So in disjoint aggregation tree construction phase, we should
guarantee that a node cannot be in both the blue tree and the red tree. Otherwise, the aggregation
trees we have constructed are not disjoint trees. Though, it is possible that an adversary may intent
to send two HELLO messages with different colors. Such behavior can be easily detected by its
neighbors due to the shared-medium nature of wireless links.
5.4 Privacy-preserving Data Report (Phase II)
To preserve the privacy in data aggregation, a node needs to hide its readings in the first hop data
reporting. Similar to SMART, each node hides its data by slicing it into pieces and randomly
sending encrypted data slices to its neighboring nodes. The difference between iSMART and
SMART is that in iSMART a node sends two copies of slices to red neighbors and blue neighbors
respectively.
While receiving the slices, a node in either blue or red color treats the summation of slices as
pseudo data, and aggregates the data along the aggregation tree6 of its own color, following the
procedure described in Section 5.5. Privacy-preserving Data Report phase includes two steps: data
slicing and data assembling.
5.4.1 Slicing
First, a node randomly slices the data into J pieces. Then the node randomly selects J red nodes
and J blue nodes from its neighbors (including itself) to send J sliced pieces. If a node itself is a
red (or blue) node, then it selects itself and J − 1 other red (blue) nodes to send the sliced pieces.
The node also selects J nodes with different color to send another copy of the J pieces. Totally,
each node takes 2J−1 transmissions in the slicing step, J slices are transmitted to different colored
nodes, and J − 1 slices go to the same colored nodes. Note that when nodes send the sliced data
6The example aggregation trees are shown in Figure 5.1.(c).
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Figure 5.2: Node i is a red node, and has a sensor reading 12. We assume a node slices the data
into 2 pieces. The node sends two slices 5 and 7 to blue neighbors, and sends one slice 8 to a red
neighbor and keeps 4 locally. Other nodes in the network slice their data and send slices to their
neighbors too, but the operation doesn’t show up in the figure.
pieces to their neighbors, link level encryption is needed. Without encrypting sliced pieces, an
adversary is able to eavesdrop all the transmissions by a given node due to the shared-medium
nature of wireless links. Hence, the adversary can easily recover the original data of that node7.
Figure 5.2 depicts the slicing step at node i, assuming node i is a red node. We denote x(i)
as the private data at node i, and xij as a slice of data sent from node i to node j. Hence, x(i) =∑N
j=1 xij . Note xii is kept locally at node i, no transmission is needed for xii. When a node i sends
a slice xij to node j, the slice is encrypted. For node j to which node i does not send any slice,
xij = 0. The final aggregation result is expressed as
f =
N∑
i=1
x(i) =
N∑
i=1
∑
j∈B
xij =
N∑
i=1
∑
j∈R
xij. (5.2)
where B stands for the blue node set, and R stands for the red node set.
7Link level encryption does not automatically provide privacy. Because, even if the link level encryption is used,
in standard aggregation protocol, TAG, neighbors a node can easily know the original data held by the leaf nodes. TAG
doesn’t protect privacy.
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5.4.2 Assembling
When a node j receives an encrypted slice, it decrypts the data using its shared key with the sender.
Upon receiving the first slice, the node waits for a certain time specified by its parent node (such
as a couple of seconds), which guarantees that all slices in this round of aggregation are received.
Then, it sums up all the received slices r(j) =
∑N
i xij , where xij = 0, if node i does not send a
sliced data to node j8. Node j treats r(j) as its data reading to be aggregated. We say r(j) is the
assembled data at node j. In the next phase, node j aggregates value r(j) along its own colored
aggregation tree to the base station.
5.5 Integrity-protecting Data Aggregation (Phase III)
After disjoint aggregation trees have been constructed (Phase I), and nodes obtain assembled data
(Phase II), the final phase of iSMART follows the standard aggregation protocol along individual
aggregation trees: nodes sum up the results from their children in the aggregation tree they belong
to, and forward the sum to their parents. Eventually, the aggregated data reaches base station.
If without data loss, it is easy to derive that on the red aggregation tree:
∑
j∈B
r(j) =
∑
j∈B
(
N∑
i=1
xij
)
=
N∑
i=1
∑
j∈B
xij =
N∑
i=1
x(i) = f. (5.3)
Similarly, on the blue aggregation tree,
∑
j∈R
r(j) =
∑
j∈R
(
N∑
i=1
xij
)
=
N∑
i=1
∑
j∈R
xij =
N∑
i=1
x(i) = f. (5.4)
However, in reality
∑
j∈B r(j) and
∑
j∈R r(j) may not exactly be the same as each other due
to inevitable data loss. But aggregation values from different trees should not deviate from each
other too much, if without pollution attack. So if |∑j∈B r(j)−∑j∈R r(j)| ≤ Th, the base station
8For example, i and j cannot reach each other.
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will accept the aggregation result; otherwise, reject it. We will discuss the selection of Th through
simulation in Section 5.7.2.
When there is a pollution attack, iSMART can detect it and reject the result. This is because in
iSMART, no single node is on two distinct aggregation trees. Hence, if an attacker inserts or alters
the intermediate aggregation value, the aggregation results from different trees will be different.
Therefore, at the base station the aggregation results from different trees do not agree with each
other, hence the polluted result will be rejected.
Note that a malicious node may issue a DoS attack by polluting the intermediate aggregation
results, forcing the base station to reject the aggregation results constantly. This can be prevented
by intelligently selecting a different portion of the sensors to participate in the aggregation at each
round, hence locate the malicious node and exclude it in O(logN) rounds.
5.6 Example
In this section, we give a simple example of iSMART protocol in Figure 5.3. The original aggre-
gation result is 6+10+8+7+8+10=49. After slicing and assembling operation, nodes aggregate the
assembled data along the aggregation tree with its same color. The aggregation results from two
disjoint trees are both 49.
Figure 5.4 compares the communication messages sent and received by an individual node in
data aggregation under TAG and iSMART respectively. In TAG, each node sends two messages
to answer a query: a HELLO message to its neighbors and a message to its parent to aggregate
intermediate result. In iSMART9, for each node additional 2J − 1 messages are introduced by
sending the J slices to neighbors. Hence, a total of 2J + 1 messages are sent by each node
including HELLO messages, data slices and aggregation result.
9Note that in iSMART protocol, the number of messages sent by a node is fixed, if the number of slices J is fixed
for all nodes. However, the number of messages received by a node is not the same.
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(a) In phase I, disjoint aggre-
gation trees are constructed.
The network nodes have their
readings.
(b) In phase II, network nodes
slice original data (J=2) and
send slices to their neighbors.
(c) In phase III, network nodes
sum up the received slices,
and aggregate slices along dis-
joint trees.
Figure 5.3: Illustration of iSMART example.
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Figure 5.4: Message overhead for TAG and iSMART
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5.7 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance and discuss some design considerations of iSMART
through detailed theoretical analysis and simulation study. For this purpose, we compare iSAMRT
and TAG [15] using ns-2 simulator.
5.7.1 Theoretical Analysis
Coverage of Aggregation Trees
In iSMART, a sensor node reports its reading to the base station by aggregation only when the
sensor node is able to reach both red and blue aggregation trees within one hop. In the case
that a node cannot reach both aggregation trees, the node will not participate in data aggregation.
Therefore, the coverage of trees affects performance of data aggregation.
Definition 1: Let Xi be the indicator variable indicating whether node i has both blue and red
neighbors within one hop distance, i.e.,
Xi =
 0, i has both blue and red neighbors;1, otherwise. (5.5)
Definition 2: Φ(G) is defined as the probability that all nodes in the graph G are covered by both
aggregation trees.
In a sparse network, where Φ(G) is small, a large portion of nodes cannot contribute their read-
ings to the aggregation result. In this case, the basic function of the wireless sensor network will
be jeopardized. That’s why we assume reasonable network density when applying the protocols
in this paper. Let us consider a random graph G(N, r), where N is number of nodes and r is the
transmission range of a node. As shown in [58], as N is large, G(N, r) is connected if and only
if there are no isolated nodes (nodes with degree zero). Therefore, if we randomly assign red or
blue color to nodes in the graph G(N, r), and let X denote the number of nodes which are isolated
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from either blue nodes or red nodes, then
Φ(G) = P (X = 0). (5.6)
For a random network whose size is large enough, {Xi} can be approximated as identical inde-
pendent distributions(IID). Therefore, the expected number of nodes which are isolated by either
of the aggregation tree is X =
∑N
i=1Xi.
Lemma 1: Let di denote the number of physical neighbors of node i, and pi be the probability that
node i is isolated by either blue nodes or red nodes or both, then
pi = 1− (1− pdib )(1− pdir ). (5.7)
The probability that i is isolated by the red aggregation tree is given as pdib (this is because that
all di neighbors of node i are blue colored). Similarly, i is isolated by the blue aggregation tree
with probability pdir . Therefore, (1 − pdib )(1 − pdir ) is the probability that node i has both red and
blue neighbors.
Lemma 2:
Φ(G) ≥ 1−
N∑
i=1
pi. (5.8)
From the Definition 1 and Lemma 1, we know pi = P (Xi = 1). Since X =
∑N
i=1Xi, we can
obtain a lower bound of Φ(G), when applying Markov Inequality P (X ≥ 1) ≤ E[X] =∑Ni=1 pi.
This bound is tighter for smaller pi values. The condition to obtain a small pi holds when the
network is dense, i.e., di is large. As an example, consider a d-regular graph (where every node
has degree d), and pb = pr = 0.5. We have Φ(G) ≥ 1 − N(1 − 122d ) according to Equation
(5.7). Therefore, Φ(G) ≥ 0.999 for N = 1000 and d = 10. From Equation (5.8), we see that the
coverage of aggregation trees is very good for dense networks.
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Communication Overhead
According to Figure 5.4, which compares message overhead between TAG and iSMART. As shown
in Section 5.6 that in iSMART, additional 2J − 1 messages are introduced by sending the J slices
of data, instead of sending the original data. So there are totally 2J + 1 messages sent by each
node. Therefore, the communication overhead ratio of iSMART to TAG is 2J+1
2
.
Performance of Privacy-preservation
As illustrated in Section 5.4, iSMART achieves privacy-preservation through slicing and assem-
bling the private data. In iSMART, we use link level encryption to prevent the data slices from
being overheard by an adversary. According to different assumptions and design goals, sensor
networks may use different types of key management and encryption schemes. One of the merits
of iSMART scheme is that it can be built on top of any key management scheme. In spite of the
link level encryption, there are two possibilities that may cause privacy violations:
• Under some key distribution schemes (e.g. random key predistribution [26] [39]), two neigh-
boring nodes share a common key for communication. However, a third node may also hold
the key and is able to decrypt messages communicated between the two nodes.
• An attacker compromises multiple neighbors of a node and gets the shared keys with the
node. In this case, the attacker may decrypt enough slices of data sent by the node, hence
obtain the original private data.
Let px denote the probability that an attacker can overhear the communication on a given
link. We are interested in obtaining the performance of privacy-preservation at a certain node i.
The performance is defined by the probability P idisclose(px), which is the probability that a node i
discloses its reading to some other nodes under a given px.
When node i slices the original data into J pieces, it sends J slices to aggregators who have
different color from itself, and sends J − 1 slices to aggregators who have the same color with
itself (in this case one of the slices is kept locally at node i). To reveal the privacy-sensitive data
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held by a node i, an attacker need either to break J outgoing links, when node i sends J slices to
aggregators of different colors; or to break J − 1 outgoing links and all of the incoming links as
well.
Definition 3: DenoteE[nJ(i)] as the expected number of incoming links of node i. ThenE[nJ(i)] =∑
j∈Neighbor(i)
(2J−1)
dj
, where Neighbor(i) is the set of node i’s one hop neighbors, and dj is the
degree (number of neighbors) of node j.
Lemma 3:
P idisclose(px) = 1− (1− pJx)(1− pJ−1+E[nJ (i)]x ). (5.9)
where pJx is the probability that an attacker can overhear all slices sent to different colored nodes.
p
J−1+E[nJ (i)]
x is the probability that an attacker can overhear all the slices sent to the same colored
nodes from node i and all slices received by node i.
Since the node i keeps a slice of data to itself, only when an attacker overhears both sent and
received, the attacker can know the original data of node i. As an example, let us consider a d-
regular network10 (d >> 2J for iSMART), where E[nJ(i)] = 2J − 1. For J = 3, d = 10 and
px = 0.1, the probability that a privacy violation occurs is P idisclose(0.1) = 0.001. For a random
network topology, the average of P idisclose(px) is defined as Pdisclose(px) =
1
N
∑N
i=1 P
i
disclose(px),
which is much larger than that in a regular graph.
Figure 5.5 plots Pdisclose(px) over px for the scenario that 1000 sensor nodes are distributed
in a square area, and the average degree of a node is 7 and 17, respectively. We observe that
the privacy preservation capacity of iSMART is insensitive to network density. We also observe
that Pdisclose(px) is smaller for J = 3 than that for J = 2. However, the privacy preservation
performance for J = 2 is good enough, and a larger J yields larger overhead in slicing and
message communication. So we recommend J = 2 in iSMART.
10d-regular network is a network where all nodes have degree d.
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Figure 5.5: Performance of privacy-preservation in iSMART
Capacity of Detecting Data Pollution
In iSMART, encryption is a necessity for privacy-preservation; otherwise, the neighboring nodes
of node i can overhear all the information transmitted and received by i, so the neighboring nodes
can conclude what the original value held by i. So link level encryption is necessary to control
which neighbors get which pieces of the data. Therefore, all the neighbors get a piece of infor-
mation but not enough to guess the original value of node i. However, link level encryption does
not help to achieve the integrity when there exists data pollution, where an attacker tampers with
the intermediate aggregation result, therefore makes the base station accept the wrong aggregation
result.
iSMART is able to detect multiple attackers as long as they do not collude with one another.
iSMART utilizes redundancy by constructing disjoint aggregation trees to check the integrity. Any
individual attacker may manipulate the intermediate aggregation results along one aggregation
tree, but the attackers cannot pollute the data on the other tree. Even if the aggregation result is
polluted by multiple individual attackers, the results from different aggregation trees cannot agree
with each other. In this case, the base station will detect the violation of data integrity. The base
station rejects the aggregation results if the results from two trees do not agree with each other. In
practice, the base station accepts the aggregation results from both aggregation trees, say Sb and
Sr, if |Sb−Sr| ≤ Th, where Th is a small positive number. Using Th helps to tolerate data losses
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caused by contention and collision of wireless channel11. We use simulation results to demonstrate
what Th value we should take in Section 5.7.2.
5.7.2 Simulation Results
iSMART employs redundancy for integrity protection and employs data slicing for privacy preser-
vation. When comparing with standard data aggregation schemes such as TAG, iSMART achieves
two important design goals, i.e., integrity and privacy, at the cost of communication overhead.
We provided the analytical results regarding the aggregation performance in Section 5.7.1. Next,
we assess the performance of iSMART through the simulation study. We implement TAG and
iSMART in ns-2 simulator. In our experiments, sensor nodes are randomly deployed over a 400
meters × 400 meters area. The transmission range of a sensor node is 50 meters and the data rate
is 1 Mbps.
Th Value Setting
In practice, with the possible data losses due to congestions and collisions in wireless sensor
networks, aggregation results from both aggregation trees (Sb and Sr) may not agree with each
other exactly. In iSMART, an adjustable parameter Th is introduced to tolerate data losses. If
|Sb − Sr| ≤ Th, the base station accepts the result. Th is an important design parameter. We sim-
ulate iSMART scheme for 50 times and obtain Figure 5.6, which illustrates the difference between
aggregation results from red and blue trees for COUNT aggregation. We notice that the differences
are small. Hence, we see that Th can be set as a small value, e.g. 5% of the final aggregation result
from either red tree or blue tree. The “perfect” curve in Figure 5.6 shows the aggregation result
where there is no data loss (ideal case). In a sparse network, the difference between ideal aggrega-
tion value and the simulated aggregation value is large, because only a small portion of nodes are
covered by blue and red trees and participate in data aggregation in sparse network. As network
11In the simulation, we assume the data loss rate is zero in physical layer. However, the protocols we proposed are
able to tolerate data loss
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density (i.e., number of nodes deployed in a certain area) increases, the portion of nodes covered
by both aggregation trees will increase. Hence, the distance between the ideal aggregation value
and simulated value is smaller as network density is turning larger.
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violation
Communication Overhead
Figure 5.7 shows the communication overhead of TAG, iSMART without slicing (J = 1), and
iSMART with slicing J = 2. The simulation result verifies our theoretical analysis result that
when we slice the data into J pieces, the total bandwidth consumption is around 2J+1
2
times of
that in the standard TAG scheme. When we deploy less than 300 sensors in the 400 meters × 400
meters square, the average degree is less than 14. Such a network density is not large enough for
iSMART protocol. In this case, some nodes may not receive the HELLO message, and some may
not have enough red and blue aggregators in their one hop neighborhood to send the sliced data.
Therefore, they cannot participate in the data aggregation according to the iSMART protocol. That
is why iSMART protocol requires higher density than TAG and SMART. So the total bandwidth
consumption is low when N < 300. This also explains why the accuracy under iSMART is poor
as shown in Section 5.7.2 below, when network density is low (N < 300). To show the effect
of network density on communication overhead and accuracy metrics, Table 5.2 summarizes the
average node degree according to a given number of nodes on a 400 meter × 400 meter square.
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Table 5.2: Network size v.s. network density
Number of nodes 200 300 400 500 600
Average degree 8.8 13.7 18.6 23.5 28.4
Coverage and Accuracy
When there is no data loss in the data aggregation, iSMART yields 100% accurate aggregation
results. However, in a real sensor network data loss is inevitable due to the following factors:
(1) In the disjoint tree construction stage, if the network density is low, then some nodes may
be unreachable by both red and blue aggregation trees. In this case, those nodes do not participate
in the data aggregation. Thus, some data is missing in the final aggregation result.
(2) In the data slicing stage, assuming each reading is sliced into J pieces, if a red node cannot
find J − 1 red neighbors and J blue neighbors within one hop, the node does not participate in the
data aggregation. Hence, the data held by such a node get lost.
(3) In disjoint tree construction, slicing, and data aggregation stages, the data loss may be
caused by collision in wireless channels.
Figure 5.8(a) illustrates the percentage of nodes which can be reached by both red tree and
blue tree. Note that data loss caused by factor (1) is reflected in Figure 5.8(a). Only if a node can
be reached by both aggregation trees and has enough neighbors to send slices of date to achieve
privacy preservation, the node participates in the data aggregation. Figure 5.8(b) shows the per-
centage of nodes which participate in the data aggregation. Hence, the data loss caused by factor
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(1) and (2) is embodied in Figure 5.8(b). All three factors are reflected in Figure 5.8(c). It demon-
strates the percentage of nodes which contribute to the final COUNT aggregation result. We define
the accuracy metric as the ratio of the collected sum by a given data aggregation protocol to the real
sum of all individual sensors. Value 1.0 of accuracy represents the ideal situation, where there is no
data loss. Figure 5.8(c) indicates the accuracy metric of iSMART comparing with TAG. A higher
accuracy value means the collected sum is more close to the real aggregated value. Figure5.8
shows that with TAG the accuracy is better than with iSMART. But TAG cannot protect data pri-
vacy and check integrity. Generally, the privacy preservation and integrity protection are at the
cost of performance, e.g., communication overhead, accuracy, etc.
Due to the similarity of Figures 5.8(a)(b)(c), we conclude that factor (1) is the dominating
factor which causes data loss in sparse network. However, when the average degree of a network
is large enough, factor (3) is the major reason for data loss. From Figure 5.8, we can also conclude
that in order to achieve excellent accuracy under iSMART with the recommended parameter J = 2,
the average network density should be larger than 18.
5.8 Concluding Remarks
Data aggregation is an important technique to save communication bandwidth and increase net-
work life time for data collection in wireless sensor networks. With more and more applications
of wireless sensor networks in various domains, how to protect the integrity and privacy of the
collected data are becoming crucial concerns.
We propose the iSMART, a novel integrity-protecting private data aggregation scheme for wire-
less sensor networks. iSMART exploits disjoint trees for data aggregation, hence facilities the base
station to identify if the data is polluted by intermediate aggregators. To protect the privacy of in-
dividual sensor readings, iSMART utilizes slicing technique to hide the privacy-sensitive data of
individual sensors from other nodes. A notable property of iSMART is, unlike sampling-based or
approximation-based schemes, iSMART can get accurate aggregation results for reasonably dense
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networks. iSMART is also light-weighted in terms of computational complexity and communica-
tion overhead.
To the best of our knowledge, this work is among the first to address both integrity protection
and privacy preservation of data aggregation simultaneously. In next chapter, we are interested
in investigating integrity-protecting privacy-preserving data aggregation schemes under collusive
attacks.
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Chapter 6
Integrity-protecting CPDA Protocol
(iCPDA)
6.1 Introduction
As an extension of SMART protocol, iSMART protocol has been presented in Chapter 5, where
we explored path redundancy to verify the integrity of aggregation result. A drawback of iSMART
is that it is incapable of defense against collaborative attackers. In this section, we present iCPDA
protocol piggyback on CPDA to detect both collaborative and individual attackers. We assume
that malicious aggregators may pollute (or modify) the intermediate aggregation results when they
perform the in-network processing and forward the aggregation results. But an attacker cannot
forge false sensor readings and input the wrong data1.
In CPDA protocol, when we calculate the intermediate aggregation result within a cluster, the
nodes in the cluster exchange messages and make cluster leader collect necessary information to
calculate the aggregation result within the cluster. In CPDA protocol, all nodes participate in the
calculation, and all nodes in the cluster can calculate the intermediate result. Hence, all peer nodes
in a cluster have the potential to monitor the behavior of the cluster leader (or aggregator). If
the cluster nodes detect that the cluster leader pollutes the result, they will report the malicious
behavior to the base station. In this Chapter, we describe the iPDA protocol, which is able to
protect integrity and privacy synergistically while aggregation is being carried out.
1The reason behind this assumption has been mentioned in Section 5.1.
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6.2 Protocol Description
In CPDA protocol, there are three phases: cluster formation, calculation of the aggregate results
within clusters, and cluster data aggregation. We desire to take advantage of peer monitoring
mechanism to achieve add-on feature of protecting integrity for CPDA in this chapter. As an ex-
tension of CPDA, iCPDA contains the same three phases as CPDA. But operations in the protocol
are adjusted to enable peer monitoring, except in cluster formation phase. Due to shared medium
nature of wireless communication, neighboring nodes are able to overhead the transmissions which
are not encrypted. In the third phase of CPDA protocol, we do not encrypt the data in the aggrega-
tion. Hence, neighbors of an aggregator can overhear the aggregation results from the aggregator’s
children and overhear the result sent from the aggregator to its parent. Therefore, it is possible for
neighbors of the aggregator to detect if the aggregator change the intermediate result. The detailed
description for iCPDA is as follows.
6.2.1 Cluster Formation & Aggregation Tree Construction (Phase I)
This phase is the same as in CPDA protocol, and has been introduced in Section 4.2.1. In this phase,
we construct clusters for privacy-preserving in-cluster aggregation. Meanwhile cluster leaders
form an aggregation tree to perform data aggregation among clusters. In the data aggregation
procedure, we enable peer monitoring to check the integrity of aggregation result. So neighboring
nodes of an aggregator are able to detect whether the aggregator cheats in data aggregation. If
so, the neighbors report the malicious behavior of the aggregator to the base station, and the base
station can judge if the final aggregation result is polluted. While a network node detects the data
pollution by a malicious aggregator, the node reports such misbehavior to the base station.
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6.2.2 Calculation within Clusters (Phase II)
Let’s consider the iCPDA protocol based on the polynomial property shown in Figure 4.2 first.
Then, we will consider iCPDA based on secure multiparty calculation2 shown in Figure 4.4. These
two flavored cluster-based protocols both can help to achieve iCPDA. The latter has smaller com-
putational complexity, however an adversary can easily narrow down the range of private value.
iCPDA Protocol Based on Algebraic Properties of Polynomials
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Figure 6.1: Message exchange in iCPDA protocol based on polynomial property
Still, we assume that a cluster contains three members: A, B, and C. a, b and c represent the
private data held by nodes A, B and C, respectively. We suppose A is the cluster leader and B
and C be cluster members. Figure 6.1 illustrates the message exchange among the three nodes
to obtain the desired sum without releasing individual private data. The difference of message
exchange between CPDA and iCPDA is that in iCPDA, cluster leader A should broadcast message
FA to other nodes in the cluster.
Following the message exchange and calculation, nodes A, B, and C are able to deduce the
aggregate value (a + b + c). The detailed description on how to calculate (a + b + c) has been
shown in Section 4.2.2.
Let us take node B as an example, and show why B cannot know private data a and c. After the
message exchange,B knows all the following variables, b, x, y, z, pb, qb, (a+b+c), V BB , V
B
A , V
B
C , V
A
B , V
C
B .
2The detailed description is shown in Section 4.2.5.
71
From all these known variables and the relation among known and unknown variables, node B
cannot figure out the unknown variables.
V AB = a+ pay + qay
2,
V CB = c+ pcy + qcy
2,
V AC = a+ paz + qaz
2,
V CC = c+ pcz + qcz
2,
V AA = a+ pax+ qax
2,
V CA = c+ pax+ qax
2,
where underlined variables are unknown to node B. There are 6 equations with 10 unknown
variables, so B is unable to deduce private data a and c. Table 6.1 illustrates which variables are
unknown to which nodes, and which variables are private information.
Table 6.1: Variables Known to Nodes
Nodes Private Variables Public Information Unknown Variables
A a, pa, qa x, y, z, (a+ b+ c) V
B
B , V
B
C , V
C
C , V
C
B , b, c, pb, qb, pc, qc
B b, pb, qb x, y, z, (a+ b+ c) V
A
A , V
A
C , V
C
C , V
C
A , a, c, pa, qa, pc, qc
C c, pc, qc x, y, z, (a+ b+ c) V
B
B , V
B
A , V
A
A , V
A
B , a, b, pb, qb, pa, qa
iCPDA Protocol Based on Secure Multiparty Calculation
To reduce the computation overhead, we will adopt CPDA based on secure multiparty calculation.
Similarly, Figure 6.2 illustrates the message exchange among the three nodes to make all three
nodes obtain the sum without releasing individual private data.
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Figure 6.2: Message exchange in iCPDA protocol based on secure multiparty calculation
6.2.3 Cluster Data Aggregation (Phase III)
After message exchange and calculation within clusters, a cluster leader together with cluster nodes
deduced aggregated value within the cluster. In this section, we show how to enable peer monitor-
ing during data aggregation phase.
Figure 6.3 shows clusters, where cluster leaders are dark nodes, and they form the aggregation
tree. In data aggregation phase of the iCPDA protocol, cluster leaders are responsible to perform
data aggregation, and cluster nodes will monitor their cluster leaders’ operation. When a cluster
leader receives intermediate aggregation results from its downstream leaders, the cluster leader
should make these results accessible to all its cluster members by broadcasting the message within
the cluster. The message should contain a list of < ID, aggrV alue >, where ID is the identity of
a downstream leader, and aggrValue is the aggregated result from node with identity ID. In CPDA
protocol, this step is omitted. For example, in Figure 6.3, aggregators (or cluster leaders) D and E
should send their intermediate aggregation results to aggregator A. Since node B and C can hear
the intermediate aggregation result from D and/or E, besides the senders B and C can tell if A
broadcasts correct aggregated values from D and E. If A cheats on the aggregated value from D
and E, node B and C can detect such misbehavior. Hence, B or C will report the misbehavior to
the base station. The report should be sent with the signatures of the reporter(s). The base station
is responsible to judge whether or not the aggregation result is trustable from these reports.
After node A broadcasts the list of < ID, aggrV alue > of its downstream leaders, A will do
in-network processing and report its aggregated value to A’s parent Q. Cluster member B and C
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Figure 6.3: Clusters and aggregators
also know the aggregated result within the cluster after Phase II, they can infer what valueA should
send to A’s parent Q. If A tries to pollute the aggregation result by replacing the intermediate
aggregation result with a fake value, both B and C will detect such malicious behavior, and report
the malicious behavior to the base station.
Two aggregators may cheat collaboratively to change the aggregation result. Whether or not
such collusive data pollution attack can be detected depends on network topology during the data
aggregation. For example, Figure 6.4 shows a scenario where data pollution by node X and Y
cannot be detected. In the figure, X is a cluster leader, and X is the parent of another cluster
leader Y . Node U , V and X are in the same cluster, where U and V are cluster members. If no
friendly nodes are located in the intersection of transmission range of X and Y , then other nodes
are unable to know what is going on between X and Y . In this case, other nodes (e.g., U and V )
cannot judge whether or not their cluster leader X broadcasts the correct value of what X have
received. Therefore, cluster members of X cannot judge if X sends correct aggregation result in
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Figure 6.4: A scenario where iCPDA is incapable of peer monitoring
data aggregation. However, the probability that friendly nodes cannot detect such collusive attacks
is small in a reasonable dense network (shown in Figure 6.7).
6.2.4 Misbehavior Reporting
In iCPDA protocol, we take the advantage of peer monitoring to make neighboring nodes of an
aggregator to monitoring the aggregator’s behavior. While a network node detects the data pollu-
tion by a malicious aggregator, the node reports such misbehavior to the base station. The report
includes the reporter’s ID, the attacker’s ID, and the value changed. The reporters should select
the unicast routes to send the report, and avoid to include the malicious aggregator(s) in the route.
Therefore, the malicious aggregator cannot alter the content of the report. While the base station
receives such reports, the base station will decide whether or not to accept the aggregation result.
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6.3 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate communication overhead, accuracy, false positive/negative rate of data
pollution detection of iCPDA protocol. The efficacy of privacy-preservation of iCPDA is the same
as CPDA protocol, because they use the same mechanism to hide the private data.
6.3.1 Communication Overhead
When comparing with CPDA, we know that the extra communication messages of iCPDA come
from phase II and III. In phase II (calculation within clusters), the cluster leader needs to broadcast
assembled information, e.g. FA in Figure 6.1, which is not required in CPDA. In phase III (cluster
data aggregation), before a cluster leader (or aggregator) sends intermediate aggregated result to its
parent, the cluster leader is required to broadcast the received intermediate aggregation result to its
cluster members. So in iCPDA, additional 2pcN messages are sent in a network with reasonable
node density, where N is the number of nodes participating in the data aggregation, and pc is
the probability that a node elects itself as a cluster leader. So totally a wireless sensor network
consumes approximately 2pcN more messages in iCPDA than in CPDA3.
We compared the communication overhead of iCPDA with CPDA through simulations. We
consider a network with 600 sensor nodes. These nodes are randomly deployed over a 400meters×
400meters area. The transmission range of a sensor node is 50 meters and data rate is 1 Mbps.
Figure 6.5 shows that iCPDA increases bandwidth consumption slightly with peer monitoring
capability. In the figure, epoch duration is the total amount of time (or deadline) for the data ag-
gregation, i.e., time interval from the time when query message is sent until the time when the
aggregation result is received by the base station.
3Note that the reporting overhead is ignorable comparing with CPDA protocol overhead.
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Figure 6.5: Comparison of communication overhead between iCPDA and CPDA, where p is the
probability that a node elects itself as a cluster leader.
6.3.2 Accuracy
The accuracy of data aggregation in iCPDA should be very similar to that in CPDA (this is verified
by Figure 6.6), since the cause of inaccuracy of these two protocols are the same and to the similar
extent, including network disconnection, poor reachability of query message due to small pc value,
etc.
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Figure 6.6: Comparison of communication overhead between iCPDA and CPDA
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6.3.3 Capacity to Detect Data Pollution Attacks
Consider Figure 6.4, where X and Y are collusive data pollution attackers on aggregation results,
and no friendly nodes are located in the intersection of transmission range of X and Y . Then the
iCPDA protocol is incapable of detecting the collusive data pollution attack by node X and Y . If
we assume the transmission range is represented by radius R, the intersection of the transmission
range has the area larger than 2
3
piR2 − √3R2. Given the average degree (or the average number
of one-hop neighbors) d and assuming friendly nodes are uniformly distributed in a certain area,
we can conclude the probability that no friendly nodes are in the intersection (shaded area in
Figure 6.4) is:
Pincapable ≤ (1−
2
3
piR2 −√3R2
piR2
)d ≈ 0.88d. (6.1)
In the typical setting suitable for CPDA, usually d > 10. For d = 10, Pincapable ≤ 0.28; for
d = 20, Pincapable ≤ 0.07. Figure 6.7 shows the probability that two collusive attackers cannot
be detected when network density changes. So for iCPDA which enables the peer monitoring
mechanism, the more dense the network is, the more powerful the protocol is to detect collusive
data pollution attacks during data aggregation.
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Figure 6.7: Probability that collusive attacks cannot be detected
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6.4 Concluding Remarks
In iCPDA protocol, friendly nodes are responsible to monitor their cluster leaders and detect data
pollution attacks. To enable peer monitoring, a little bit more messages are required during data
aggregation. Hence, the message overhead is a little bit larger than CPDA.
Comparing with iSMART, iCPDA is able to detect collusive attacks under reasonable dense
network topology, because the nodes intending to issue data pollution attacks cannot control the
positions and behavior of friendly nodes. iSMART helps to tell whether or not there exists indi-
vidual data pollution attacks; and iCPDA is able to detect which node is the attacker.
79
Chapter 7
Tradeoffs Between Privacy and Integrity
In Chapter 6 and Chapter 5, we extended privacy-preserving data aggregation (PDA) protocols
to address integrity of the data aggregation. Privacy preservation and integrity protection are two
conflicting functions, since privacy-preserving schemes try to hide individual data, while integrity
protection usually requires public access of the data. In this chapter, we discuss the tradeoffs
between privacy preservation and integrity protection in the protocol design.
7.1 Tradeoffs in Cluster Based Protocol
7.1.1 How pc Affects Performance
As shown in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6, pc is an important design parameter, which is the probability
that each node elects itself as a cluster leader. In a reasonable dense network, pc is a reciprocal of
the average cluster size in a wireless sensor network. That means the larger pc value, the smaller
the clusters. As we alluded in Chapter 4 that the larger the cluster is, the higher communication
and computational overhead will be incurred. However, as indicated in Figure 4.6(a), the larger
the cluster is, the better privacy CPDA or iCPDA can achieve. Next, we discuss how cluster size
affects the privacy and integrity.
iCPDA protocol is design to defend against data pollution attack on aggregated values. How-
ever, data pollution attack on individual sensory data can be severer if the cluster size is larger. We
assume a sensory data has a certain range [dmin, dmax] as mentioned in Section 2.2. If a cluster
size is m and the actual aggregated value of a cluster is val, the maximum bias a cluster may bring
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is max(m × dmax − val, val −m × dmin), this is because the maximum aggregated value of the
cluster is m × dmax and the minimum aggregated value is m × dmin. If the aggregated value is
outside of the range [m × dmin,m × dmax], other nodes can detect the data pollution attack in a
cluster easily. Hence, under the pollution attack, the larger the cluster size m is, the larger poten-
tial bias a cluster may introduce. Even though the larger a cluster size is, the better the CPDA can
preserve the privacy of individual sensory data, we should not make the average cluster size very
large due to the integrity concern and protocol efficiency in terms of computational complexity
and communication overhead. In a reasonable dense network, we can take pc around 0.2, which
means the average cluster size is around 5 (Figure 4.3).
7.1.2 Computational Complexity v.s. Privacy
In cluster-based secure multiparty data aggregation schemes, a node in a cluster sends m− 1 data
pieces to m − 1 different nodes in the cluster (assuming cluster size is m). Then cluster nodes
aggregate the received data pieces. In such a cluster based scheme, computation load is composed
of addition operation, which is simpler than the computational complexity of the cluster based
protocol based on algebraic properties of polynomials. However, the advantage of the latter is that
adversaries cannot guess partial values of individual data. Therefore, we can trade computational
complexity for privacy in CPDA protocols, when comparing the protocol in Section 4.2 with the
cluster-based secure multiparty data aggregation protocol.
7.2 Tradeoffs in SMART Based Protocol
7.2.1 How J Affects Performance
The design parameter in SMART or iSMART is J , which is the number of pieces each node slices
data. We already demonstrated that communication overhead is proportional to J , e.g., each node
needs to send J + 1 messages during the data aggregation. This is also reflected in Figure 4.7(c).
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We also showed that a larger J will achieve better privacy preservation. For privacy and efficiency
tradeoff, J should not be large, and we suggested that J = 3.
Usually a sensory data has a range [dmin, dmax]. To confine the harm of data pollution attack
on individual sensory data, we usually place a lower bound smin and an upper bound smax for
sliced data in iSMART, so that each slice of data is in [smin, smax]. Hence, the maximum bias an
individual sensor i may bring is in the range max(J × smax − xi, xi − J × smin), where xi is
the actual reading of node i. For example, assume xi = 10, J = 3, smax = 6, and smax = 2, a
malicious node may send three slices of 6 or 2 to pretend xi = J×smax = 18 or xi = J×smin = 6.
So the bias introduced is either -4 or 8. From this example, we know that J affects how large a
bias a node can introduce to the final aggregation result, and a larger J will allow an individual
sensor to bring a larger bias. Fortunately, in iSMART, the suggested J value is 2 or 3, so the data
pollution on individual sensory data is not severe.
7.2.2 Should Negative Values Be Allowed in Data Slices?
Generally, SMART and iSMART protocols allow negative slices. Negative slices make it harder
for adversaries to narrow down the range of private data held by a given node. For example, let’s
consider when data range is [0, 10], and a node has private data 8. The node may slice 8 into three
pieces 2, 5, 1. When an adversary receives 5, it can easily know the private data is in the range of
[5, 10] if negative slices are not allowed. For better privacy preservation, we should allow negative
slices.
On the other hand, negative values will affect accuracy when a slice is lost. For example, if
a private data 8 is sliced in to -5, 12, 1. The loss of a single piece, say 12, may incur bias larger
than the original data 8. This is because if negative values are allowed, the positive pieces must
be larger to cancel out the negative pieces in the aggregation result. So we want to place a lower
bound smin and an upper bound smax for sliced data in SMART or iSMART. What smin and smax
we should take depends on the range of individual sensory data. For example, let’s consider the
range of a private data is from 0 to 10, and the private data is 8. For J = 3, we can define the
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upper bound of slices be smax = 4, and lower bound as smin = −2. In this case, the bias caused
by loss of a certain data piece is 4 (= (J − 1) × smin). The maximum bias a node can bring is
max(3× 4− 8, 8− 3× (−2)) = 14 due to data pollution on individual sensory data. But, in terms
of privacy preservation, if a node receives any piece with value between [-2, 4], the node cannot
narrow down the range of private data.
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Chapter 8
Final Remarks
8.1 Summary of Dissertation
It is envisioned that civilian applications of wireless sensor networks are to set a new paradigm of
pervasive computing, and bring next society-transforming change. In the future, physical systems
and environment are represented in bits. Information collection about the surrounding physical
world is paramount to us, because data is the key to understand the world, to build good models,
and also the key to make right decisions. Huge amounts of data that were once impossible or too
expensive to collect will become the foundation of many new services. Thanks to the development
of networked embedded systems, data collection with fine granularity and over large population
is more and more feasible. Data processing techniques, (e.g. data aggregation, data mining)
have been investigated for a while. However, plenty of efforts are needed before wireless sensor
networks can realize their promise in civilian applications. Data privacy and integrity, among the
biggest concerns which affect the practicality of wireless sensor networks in civilian applications,
may make individual users refuse to contribute their sensitive data during information collection.
Without enough data sources, the information collection must be biased. Another major con-
cern of information collected is to check the integrity of data. This dissertation focuses on pro-
tocol design for privacy-preserving and integrity-protecting data aggregation in wireless sensor
networks, where privacy and integrity are among the big concerns.
First, we have proposed two privacy-preserving protocols, SMART and CPDA respectively.
SMART was built on slicing techniques and the associative property of addition. It has the ad-
vantage of incurring less computation overhead for privacy-preserving data aggregation. CPDA
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leverages clustering protocol and algebraic properties of polynomials. It has the advantage to
enable peer monitoring within a cluster. Then we have extensively explored the possibility to ad-
dress both privacy and integrity simultaneously. We devised iSMART and iCPDA protocols as
the extension of SMART and CPDA, to address integrity of privacy-preserving data aggregation
schemes.
8.2 Improving Protocol Efficiency
We notice that both CPDA and SMART trade message overhead for privacy. However, sometimes
message overhead is a big concern, especially in mobile and pervasive computing scenarios. So
it is very natural to ask: “Can we further improve efficiency or reduce the message overhead of
the proposed protocols, and how?” In our original design space, the metrics we used include
computational overhead, accuracy, privacy preserving capability. For better efficiency what else
can we trade off? What will happen if we explore one more dimension such as delay? For example,
an effective way to reduce message overhead in data aggregation is to delay data aggregation until
a series of data are collected at individual nodes. Then, these nodes use an efficient representation
to express the data series, and aggregate the parameters of the representation. Finally, the base
station can recover the original data series. In such a way, message overhead of data aggregation
can be further reduced. For example, if we want to send integer 1, 2, 3, · · · , 99 to a receiver, we
will prefer to send “positive integers less than 100” than 99 integers to save bandwidth.
For additive data aggregation in the context of this dissertation, the representation should have
the following property: A new representation must make the in-network processing keep the orig-
inal additive information of xi. A candidate of the efficient representation is the polynomial after
curve fitting on data series xt. For example, if a node j gets a set of measurement, e.g. 10 data
points xjt, 1 ≤ t ≤ 10 from a sinuate curve (shown in Figure 8.1). Performing six-order poly-
nomial curve fitting on these 10 data points, the node uses a polynomial shown in Figure 8.1 to
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represent the original curve points. The six-order polynomial representation of the curve is
fj(t) =
6∑
k=0
pjkt
k ∀node i. (8.1)
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Figure 8.1: Using curve fitting to represent original data points
Assume every node gets a polynomial curve representing its measurements. If these nodes
aggregate parameters (e.g. pjk, ∀node j) to the base station, we can finally get an aggregated
curve, say F (.). Then,
F (t) =
∑
j
fj(x) =
∑
k
[(
∑
j
pjk)t
k] =
∑
k
Pkt
k. (8.2)
where Pk =
∑
j pjk. Hence, we use F (t), 1 ≤ t ≤ 10 to approximate
∑n
i xi, where n is the
number of participants in data aggregation.
The above example shows that a node, e.g., node j, only needs 7 parameters pjk, 0 ≤ k ≤ 6 to
approximate the original 10 data points. So with polynomial curve fitting technique, data aggrega-
tion protocols consume only 70% of the bandwidth as the original protocols. If we use polynomial
functions which is less than six order, we can save more bandwidth. But such bandwidth efficiency
is at the cost of accuracy, because the higher the order of polynomial curve is, the more accurate
approximation we can get; on the other hand, the more bandwidth is required.
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8.3 Design Dimensions
Besides privacy and integrity, efficiency, real-time response and accuracy can be several desired
features or requirements for data aggregation in wireless sensor networks. However, these require-
ments could be contrary to each other. For example:
1. Data aggregation can significantly reduce communication overhead and has been adopted
widely to improve network efficiency. However, as a general way to protect information
security, end-to-end encryption and decryption may paralyze data aggregation because in-
termediate aggregation data needs to be accessible for in-network processing during data
aggregation.
2. Data privacy requires techniques to hide original sensing data, but we usually adopt peer
monitoring mechanisms to achieve data integrity. Therefore, privacy-preserving techniques
could be a barrier to achieve integrity.
3. In batch data processing as shown in Section 8.2, we can apply data compression techniques
to improve efficiency; however, a certain delay is added to break the real-time requirement.
Hence, efficiency and real-time response are contrary in some scenarios.
In our design, we trade efficiency for privacy in SMART and CPDA based approaches. In
several other privacy-preserving data aggregation protocols, we can trade accuracy for privacy
by using various perturbation based schemes. In our design, we trade efficiency for privacy in
SMART and CPDA based approaches. In design of privacy-preserving and integrity-protection
data aggregation, there are multiple directions and trade-offs in design space to consider. We can
choose different schemes according to specific requirements of different applications.
8.4 Future Work
The work we proposed in this dissertation helps to preserve privacy of individual data and protect
integrity of data aggregation result for a single query. Adversaries may issue a sequence of queries
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to get individual private data or guess the trend of a private data over time. We will leave query
based privacy preservation in the future work. Another challenging future direction is to develop
incentive based schemes to encourage individual nodes to contribute their data correctly. Hence,
the data pollution attacks on individual sensory data will be invalidated.
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